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THE DEATH OF CORPORATE LAW
ZOHAR GOSHEN† & SHARON HANNES‡
For decades, corporate law played a pivotal role in regulating corporations across
the United States. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and
its courts came to occupy a central and influential position in corporate law and
governance. This, however, is no longer the case: The compositional shift in equity
markets from retail to institutional ownership has relocated regulatory power over
corporations from courts to markets. Corporate law has, as a result, and as illustrated by the declined role of the Delaware courts, lost its pride of place and is now
eclipsed by shareholder activism.
What explains the connection between the rise of institutional ownership and the
death of corporate law? We answer this question by unpacking the relationship
between market dynamics and the role of corporate law. Our analysis uncovers a
critical, yet hitherto unnoticed, insight: The more competent shareholders become,
the less important corporate law will be. Increases in shareholder competence
reduce management agency costs, intensify market actors’ preference for private
ordering outside of courts, and, ultimately, drive corporate law into the shadow.
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1 For a representative sampling of the academic treatment of the Delaware courts, see
Symposium, The Delaware Court of Chancery: Change, Continuity—and Competition, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 387.
2 See JEFFREY W. BULLOCK, DEL. DIV. OF CORPS., 2012 ANN. REP. 1, http://
corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/2012CorpAR.pdf (noting that sixty-four percent of Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in Delaware); see also LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF
STATE, WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007), http://corp.delaware.gov/pdfs/
whycorporations_english.pdf (explaining several reasons for Delaware’s appeal).
3 Tellingly, the most widely used casebooks for the class on Corporations focus, almost
exclusively, on Delaware law. See, e.g., MELVIN AARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX,
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS, at iii (11th ed. 2014) (providing a
Delaware-centric approach to corporate law); WILLIAM A. KLEIN, J. MARK RAMSEYER &
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND CORPORATIONS, at iii (9th ed. 2015) (same). Many scholars
have attributed the centrality of Delaware courts in corporate law to Delaware’s unique
judicial system. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225,
277–78 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Law as a Product] (describing the benefits accruing
from Delaware’s “substantial body” of precedent, its “judicial expertise” in corporate law,
and the predictability of its judicial decisions); Roberta Romano, The State Competition
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For decades, Delaware law and Delaware courts have played a
central part in corporate law and governance.1 More than half of the
publicly traded firms in the United States are incorporated in
Delaware,2 and in many U.S. law schools, Delaware corporate law has
become virtually synonymous with American corporate law.3 While
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some experts have praised Delaware courts for their efficiency and
sophistication in adjudicating corporate disputes,4 and others have
accused the Delaware courts of pro-management leanings,5 very few
would dispute that Delaware courts have played a critical role in
shaping corporate law in the United States.
This Article argues that corporate law is no longer vital to the
regulation of U.S. corporations. The transformation of American
equity markets from retail to institutional ownership6 has relocated
control over corporations from courts to markets and has led to the
death of corporate law.7 As a result, and as an illustration of this
broader phenomenon, Delaware courts today play a fundamentally
different—and much less influential—role in corporate disputes.
Indeed, we show that corporate law jurisprudence originating from
the Delaware courts is no longer active as a substantive regulatory
influence. While other scholars have argued that Delaware’s retreat
reflects judicial volition,8 our point here is different: We argue that the

41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 50 Side A
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Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 722 (1987) [hereinafter Romano, State
Competition] (noting that Delaware’s “case law” and “judicial expertise in corporate law”
contribute to its dominance); see also infra notes 217–20 and accompanying text (exploring
the dominance of the Delaware courts).
4 See, e.g., William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 570, 570–71 (“The Court’s approach has allowed it to supervise the market
for corporate control and clarify the competing rights and obligations of corporate
stakeholders with efficiency uncommon for a common law court.”).
5 See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 670, 671–84 (1974) (“Judicial decisions in Delaware illustrate
that the courts have undertaken to carry out the ‘public policy’ of the state and create a
‘favorable climate’ for management.”).
6 See infra Section III.A.
7 Our title is intentionally similar to that of Professor Grant Gilmore’s seminal book,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). Just as Gilmore argued that tort law had steadily
absorbed and superseded contract law, id. at 87, we aim to demonstrate that market actors’
use of discretionary control rights—i.e., shareholder activism—has largely displaced
corporate law and corporate litigation. See infra Part I.
8 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing
Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 324–25
(2018) (documenting Delaware’s doctrinal retreat in four leading corporate cases); Ronald
J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 15 n.47 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe
eds., 2018), http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198743682.
001.0001/oxfordhb-9780198743682-e-10 (“[T]he Delaware courts appear to have begun
recognizing the impact on governance of the intermediation of equity.”); Steven Davidoff
Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s Takeover Standards 5
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 329, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2830257 (arguing that Delaware’s takeover standard first expounded in the 1980s
has been watered down by its courts’ attempts to give way to market forces). Others,
however, continue to believe that the Delaware courts maintain their role as the final
arbiters between shareholders and management. See, e.g., Donald F. Parsons, Jr. & Jason
S. Tyler, Activist Stockholders, Corporate Governance Challenges, and Delaware Law, in
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transformation of U.S. equity markets has largely displaced much of
Delaware courts’ institutional centrality.9
We begin by showing the extent of the declined role of Delaware
courts. Until recently, Delaware courts engaged in a high level of judicial involvement with corporate disputes. Historically, conflicts over
corporate control in the United States frequently originated from hostile takeover attempts. In a series of landmark decisions beginning in
the 1980s, Delaware courts played a pivotal role in the resolution of
this breed of disputes. In its celebrated Unocal decision, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that board-adopted defenses against hostile takeovers would receive enhanced judicial scrutiny.10 Later decisions
applying Unocal allowed boards to unilaterally adopt poison pills and
then “just say no” to hostile takeovers, notwithstanding shareholders’
desires.11
Meanwhile, the Court of Chancery’s holding in Blasius provided
courts with the means to scrutinize board interference with shareholder voting rights.12 Unocal and Blasius—along with the Delaware
Supreme Court’s development of so-called “Revlon duties” that apply
to board behavior in change-of-control scenarios13—entrenched the
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RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 377, 394 (Claire A. Hill &
Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016).
9 See infra Part II.
10 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“If a
defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”).
11 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (applying
the business judgment rule to the board’s adoption of a poison pill because it was adopted
“in the good faith belief that it was necessary to protect” the corporation). While poison
pills come in many different varieties, “the key concept behind [Moran and] the poison pill
is that it deters a potential acquirer from purchasing the stock of the target by making a
takeover unprofitable.” Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans:
Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 642 (2012); see also Brett H.
McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 205, 209 (2005) (“Conventional wisdom is that the presence of an unredeemed
poison pill makes a takeover prohibitively expensive for the bidder.”).
12 See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661–62 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding
that boards “bear[ ] the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification” when
taking any action “for the primary purpose of interfering with the effectiveness of a
corporate vote”). Blasius was later approved by the Delaware Supreme Court. See
Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 927 (Del. 1990) (noting that
the Delaware General Corporation Law has “a general policy against disenfranchisement”
(quoting Blasius, 564 A.2d at 669)).
13 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986) (explaining that when the dissolution of a company becomes inevitable, “directors
cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending
factions”). For background on Revlon’s role and development, see generally J. Travis
Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 7 (2013).
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Delaware courts’ position as the ultimate arbiter of corporate control
disputes. This power effectively allowed the courts to dictate the allocation of control rights between boards and shareholders.14
All of this, however, has changed. Delaware courts no longer
wield this same level of influence. With respect to control rights,15
there are numerous manifestations of the courts’ waning influence.16
Consider the fact that while boards are free under Delaware jurisprudence to adopt a poison pill to fend off hostile takeovers,17 directors
might be hesitant to do so, fearing shareholders’ reactions. Accordingly, in more than half of all contemporary hostile bids, a poison pill
is never implemented, even after the hostile bid is launched.18
Delaware default law which allows poison pills thus has become irrelevant, along with an elaborated case law setting the limits of poison
pills’ design and usage. Similarly, Delaware courts permit boards to
use a poison pill together with a staggered board19—a combination
some consider takeover-preclusive.20 Since the 1990s, public companies have had difficulty in installing new staggered board charter provisions,21 but those that already had such provisions have held on to
them and were highly protected. Such law-driven path dependence is,
however, no longer determinative as shareholder activists have managed to dismantle most staggered boards via pressure exerted outside
14

See infra Section I.A.
With respect to cash flow rights, the Delaware courts have in several recent cases
similarly, and explicitly, shifted power to shareholders. See infra Section I.B.3.
16 For a more detailed list of such developments, see infra Section I.B.
17 See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357.
18 See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware’s Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2014) (“[I]n
recent years 59% of companies without pills have not put them in when a [hostile] bid is
brought.”).
19 See, e.g., Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(approving the board’s continued use of a poison pill even when combined with a
staggered board—a board in which only a third of its members are up for reelection every
year). Combining a staggered board with a poison pill is significant because poison pills,
which allow managers to stymie a hostile takeover attempt as long as the managers remain
in office, operate under the assumption that the shareholders’ ability to “vote out” the
managers acts as a “safety valve” to this absolute blockade. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
John C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890 (2002). However, if a
board is staggered, requiring multiple years of voting before a majority of the board can be
voted out, “this safety valve is illusory.” Id.
20 See Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 919 (“[Staggered boards]
should provide incumbents virtually complete protection from hostile bids, with all of the
potential drawbacks in terms of managerial agency costs that are associated with such
insulation.”).
21 See John C. Coates, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers,
89 CALIF. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (2001).
15
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the courtroom.22 Sidestepping the courts, shareholder activists
engaged in an extremely successful campaign, leading ultimately to an
eighty percent drop in staggered boards among Standard & Poor
(S&P) 500 companies.23
Moreover, and perhaps most strikingly, the use of “hedge-fund
activism” has become a routine method for shareholders to wield control rights outside of courts.24 Activist hedge funds procure a relatively
small stake in a company, issue a “white paper” detailing criticisms of
the company’s management, and then campaign for other shareholders to vote against management in a proxy fight.25 To avoid the
fiasco of a public proxy dispute, and despite the Delaware courts’
approval of anti-activist poison pills,26 companies often settle with
activists behind the scenes, for example, by allowing the activist to
appoint individuals of its choosing to the company’s board.27 In other

41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 51 Side B
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22 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Case Against Staggered Boards, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:43 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/the-caseagainst-staggered-boards (describing activist shareholders’ campaigns to de-stagger boards
of public companies).
23 Andrew Ross Sorkin, An Unusual Boardroom Battle, in Academia, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Jan. 5, 2015, 9:42 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/05/an-unusualboardroom-battle-in-academia/.
24 For background on the ability of hedge fund activists to assert control rights, see
generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863
(2013); Ken Squire, A Golden Age for Activist Investing, BARRON’S (Feb. 16, 2009, 11:59
PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/SB123457667407886821.
25 A proxy fight is “a campaign to solicit votes (or proxies) in opposition to
management at an annual or special meeting of stockholders or through action by written
consent.” Warren S. de Wied, Proxy Contests, PRACTICAL L.J., Nov. 2010, at 32, 33, https://
www.wsgr.com/publications/pdfsearch/dewied1110.pdf (providing introductory
information on modern proxy contests). For an overview of the toolkit used by activist
investors, see also Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist
Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-hedge-funds-and-other-activistinvestors.
26 See Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, C.A. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *16–17
& n.18 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (applying the Delaware court’s Unocal standard in judging
the legitimacy of an anti-activist poison pill).
27 In Third Point, for instance, the hedge fund plaintiff refused to abandon its campaign
and instead used the threat of a proxy fight to leverage the board into partially acceding to
its demands. See Agustino Fontevecchia, Truce! Dan Loeb’s Third Point Gets 3 Board
Seats, but Sotheby’s CEO Bill Ruprecht Stays on Board, FORBES (May 5, 2014 12:49 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2014/05/05/truce-dan-loebs-third-point-gets-3board-seats-but-sothebys-ceo-bill-ruprecht-stays-on-board (reporting that Third Point
secured three board seats and the removal of a poison pill, while Sotheby’s CEO Bill
Ruprecht held on to his role as president and chairman of the board). Even in dramatic
public proxy fights, settlements are not unprecedented. See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced,
Arconic Settles with Elliott After Bruising and Public Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/dealbook/arconic-elliott-settlement.html
(describing one such settlement after a very public, and highly contentious, proxy fight).
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cases, institutional investors and proxy advisers preempt the court in
deciding seemingly legal disputes between activists and management.28 By taking advantage of the pressure generated through threatening a proxy fight, and by other means, activists can sidestep judicial
oversight altogether, rendering corporate law largely irrelevant.29 Litigation is no longer central in resolving control disputes.
What brought about the death of corporate law? This Article
answers this complicated question with a theory that focuses on the
relationship between market dynamics and the law. In short, the more
competent shareholders become, the less important corporate law will
be. This is why the dramatic rise of institutional ownership in the
United States coincided with the eclipse of corporate law. By applying
this general insight to the Delaware courts, we are able to explain the
declined role of Delaware courts and to discuss this insight’s legal and
policy implications for the future of Delaware.
The starting point for our theory is the understanding that corporate contracts are always “incomplete.”30 The principal (the shareholders) invests in, and the agent (the board) manages, a firm in order
to create future value. But beyond the general instruction to “maximize firm value,”31 there are few (if any) enforceable precepts as to
how to manage the firm. Instead, the parties agree to a general allocation of control rights (which govern the apportionment of decisionmaking power over the firm) and cash-flow rights (which govern the
apportionment of firm-generated value). In this incomplete contract,
conflicts may arise as to the allocation and use of these two types of
rights.32 The principal and the agent, therefore, must decide which
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 52 Side A
04/26/2019 09:52:55

28 See infra notes 88–97 and accompanying text (discussing the disappearance of bylaw
provisions that limit so-called “Golden Leashes,” compensation arrangements of directors
nominated by activist hedge funds).
29 See infra Section I.B.2. Activists may only turn to a court if the threat of a proxy fight
fails to generate the desired response. See, e.g., Steven Davidoff Solomon, Why Einhorn’s
Win May Be Apple’s Gain N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013, 10:02 AM), https://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/why-einhorns-win-may-be-apples-gain (“Had the
proposal gone to a vote at the shareholder meeting on Wednesday, [the activist] would
likely have lost and the charter would have been amended. So he took a different tactic.
He sued.”).
30 See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56
ECONOMETRICA 755, 755 (1988) (“Since it may be prohibitively costly to specify, in a way
that can be enforced, the precise actions that each party should take in every conceivable
eventuality, the parties are in practice likely to end up writing a highly incomplete
contract.”).
31 For the classic case, see Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.”).
32 Corporate control rights conflicts are most visible in contests for control over the
entire corporation, such as a hostile takeover in which one corporation attempts to acquire
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conflicts to resolve on their own—via discretionary control rights such
as shareholder voting—and which conflicts to resolve with the aid of a
court—via duty-enforcement rights such as the right to sue for breach
of directors’ fiduciary duties.
But when will shareholders and boards prefer to engage courts in
resolving corporate disputes as opposed to resolving conflicts via discretionary control rights? Exercise of corporate control rights generates control costs, which include competence and conflict costs, for
both the principal (“principal costs”) and the agent (“agent costs”).33
Under conventional economic assumptions, shareholders and boards
will aim to minimize the sum of those costs in order to increase firm
value.34 Critically, we observe that enlisting courts in an effort to
reduce these control costs will itself impose both competence costs
and conflict costs spawned by the adjudication process. Therefore, the
use of courts will only be efficient when it minimizes the total control
costs created by all three players—the principal, the agent, and the
courts.
Our analysis shows that the relative magnitude of principal competence and court competence is a crucial determinant of whether the
parties will prefer judicial intervention as opposed to the use of discretionary control rights. When the principal has relatively low competence (as with retail investors) the parties are more likely to rely on a
court for dispute resolution. By contrast, when the principal has relatively high competence (as with institutional investors),35 the parties
are more likely to resolve these issues on their own through the use of
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 52 Side B
04/26/2019 09:52:55

another. Challenging the right of the target corporation’s board to adopt “takeover
defenses” without shareholder consent is a dispute over the allocation of control rights
between the board and shareholders. Disputes over the allocation of cash-flow rights, on
the other hand, arise when a conflict has the potential to influence the division of cash
flows or assets. For example, minority shareholders in a public corporation may dispute
whether the price offered for the minority shares by the controlling owner in a merger was
fair.
33 Control costs include the efforts parties take to avoid the incursion of these costs.
See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 779 (2017) (providing a detailed description
and discussion of both principal costs and agent costs). Control costs can also stem from
asymmetric information and differences of opinion between principals and agents. See
Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE
L.J. 560, 565 (2016).
34 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 33, at 784, 829 (discussing minimizing control costs
in the context of optimal governance structure).
35 Institutional investors have higher competence as shareholders because they employ
teams of professional investment managers who are knowledgeable and experienced in
business and finance. See, e.g., Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era
of Corporate Compliance 1 (2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3194605 (discussing institutional investors capacity to promote
better governance).
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discretionary control rights. The efficiency of extrajudicial conflict resolution positively correlates with the principal’s competence. The
more competent the principal, the greater the probability that actors
will prefer using discretionary control rights to resolve disputes
outside of the adjudication process.
As increased institutional ownership and complementary market
mechanisms (such as hedge fund activism36 and proxy advisors37) bolster the competence of U.S. investors, our theory predicts—and
reality seems to vindicate—that judicial dispute resolution becomes a
less desirable option. And as companies have grown accustomed to
the ability of institutional investors to discipline management outside
of the courtroom,38 companies have come to care more about their
investors’ business opinions than the Delaware courts’ judicial opinions.39 Over time, this dynamic has marginalized corporate law and
has eroded the significance of the Delaware courts.
36

For more on hedge fund activism, see infra Section I.B.2.
Proxy advisory firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass,
Lewis & Co. (Glass Lewis), provide institutional investors with recommendations on proxy
votes, theoretically providing institutional investors with the opinion of experts wielding
the time and resources to analyze individual proxy votes in ways that institutional
shareholders cannot. See generally George W. Dent, Jr., A Defense of Proxy Advisors,
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1287, 1290–96. Because proxy advisors, for a variety of reasons,
have made votes against corporate management more common, their presence in the
market has shifted the locus of power in any given proxy vote further toward the
institutional owners. See id. at 1289.
38 See, e.g., Madison Marriage, BlackRock Bulks Up Governance Staff, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
30, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/657b243c-e492-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a?mhq5j=e2
(discussing the sizeable expansions in corporate governance teams by BlackRock,
Vanguard, and State Street in order to monitor and influence corporate behavior). It is
worth noting that many have optimistically embraced the increased activism of institutional
investors. See, e.g., David Larrabee, The Financial Industry: A New Discipline of
Ownership, CFA INST. ENTERPRISING INV. (June 6, 2017), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/
investor/2017/06/06/the-financial-industry-a-new-discipline-of-ownership (calling the
present a “pivotal moment for the industry, when institutional investors went from being
passive owners to embracing their roles as responsible stewards for the industry, their
customers, and society”). Indeed, institutional investors have become aggressive in their
disciplinary behavior, going as far as to threaten to vote against directors for all boards
upon which they sit, even those not committing the disputed action. See, e.g., Jessica
Toonkel, Big Fund Firm Blacklists Directors Who Support Poison Pills, REUTERS (Apr. 29,
2015, 1:22 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-dfa-poisonpills-boards-insightidUSKBN0NK0AM20150429 (discussing one example where a mutual fund vocally
threatened boards who took actions against shareholder approval).
39 Many companies have responded by arranging to meet with large institutional
investors throughout the year to discuss “strategy, performance, board membership and
quality of management.” Theodore Lynn, Institutional Investor Monitoring, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1422, 1424 (S.O. Idowu et al. eds.,
2013), https://link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-3-642-28036-8_224.
This strategy is called “shareholder engagement.” See, e.g., Russell Miller, Engage Your
Shareholders If You Want a “Yes Vote,” WORKSPAN, Feb. 2015, at 44, 46 (“Direct
37
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The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I illustrates the death of corporate law through a discussion of the evolution
and decline in the role of Delaware courts. Part II presents our principal-agent theory concerning the role of courts in corporate dispute
resolution. Part III discusses the policy implications of the theory we
present in Part II, as well as predictions for the future. We then briefly
conclude.
I
THE DECLINED ROLE

OF

DELAWARE COURTS

In the recent past, corporate America held its breath in anticipation of the Delaware courts’ rulings—the Delaware courts held the
ultimate power to influence and even craft the rules of the corporate
game. The Delaware courts no longer occupy this same predominance
as an arbiter of corporate conflict. This Part explores the special, and
central, role of the Delaware courts (Section I.A) and the more recent
decline that has occurred (Section I.B). We focus on Delaware in
order to illustrate the death of corporate law more broadly because
Delaware is widely considered the most important corporate law
forum. But our theory, presented fully in Part II, is not forumdependent.
A. The Delaware Courts as Arbiter of Corporate Conflict

04/26/2019 09:52:55

shareholder engagement encourages a two-way dialogue between companies and their
investors, allowing shareholders to share their thoughts and points of view.”).
40 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 2–3 (1933) (observing that in the modern corporate structure, “tens or
even hundreds of thousands of individuals are combined through the corporate mechanism
into a single producing organization under unified control and management”).
41 Id. at 66.
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In their seminal book The Modern Corporation and Private
Property, Professor Adolf Berle and economist Gardiner Means highlighted the dispersed ownership structure of many U.S. public corporations.40 Berle and Means suggested that the many minuscule retail
investors populating the U.S. capital market were unable to exercise
any control over the corporations in which they held shares.41 Taking
account of this weakness, the Delaware courts took up the role of
shareholder guardian. The Delaware courts approached this role with
a dichotomous focus, separating self-dealing transactions (transactions
in which a controlling owner, the board, or management participates
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on both sides),42 on the one hand, from all other business decisions,43
on the other.
The unprecedented wave of mergers and acquisitions during the
1980s intensified the role of the Delaware courts as arbiters between
boards and shareholders over control rights conflicts.44 Control fights
between corporate boards and would-be acquirers required courts to
determine the extent to which boards may decide, notwithstanding the
desires of shareholders, whether, and to whom, to sell the company.
Much of modernity’s relevant takeover jurisprudence crystalized
during this 1980s heyday. Unocal and its progeny, in developing a flexible and fact-intensive standard of review for anti-takeover mechanisms, affirmed an active role for the Delaware courts in the takeover
context.45 The Delaware Supreme Court made clear in Unocal that
board anti-takeover measures would be reviewed under the business
judgment rule only if such measures were found to be “reasonable in
relation to the threat posed.”46 Unocal epitomizes the tendency of the
Delaware courts, when faced with a dispute over control rights, to
take on an interventionist role governed by a standard-like balancing
test.47
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42 In cases of self-dealing, the Delaware courts scrutinize the business terms of the
transaction reached by the board under the so-called “entire fairness” doctrine. This
assessment often requires the court to perform complicated financial valuations, a feat only
practicable due to the relative financial savvy of Delaware judges. See Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710, 714 (Del. 1983) (discussing and applying the “entire fairness”
doctrine).
43 For non-self-dealing corporate decisions and transactions, the court adheres to the
deferential “business judgment rule” and refrains from second-guessing the business
decisions of the board and the management. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
811–13 (Del. 1984) (discussing and applying the “business judgment rule”).
44 See, e.g., Edward F. Greene, Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Takeover
Activity in the 1980s: The United States and Europe, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 1560–61 (1991)
(discussing Delaware’s response to the takeover wave of the 1980s).
45 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The Unocal court
explained that when a company is facing a takeover threat, the directors’ own interest in
maintaining control is necessarily conflicted with the interests of the shareholders. Id. at
955. In light of this conflict, in order to be protected by the business judgment rule, the
directors taking defensive actions must show that they acted in good faith after reasonable
investigation. Id. The defensive action must be shown to have been reasonable, considering
the threat to the shareholders posed by the takeover. Id. For more on the Unocal standard
of review, see Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 586–88 (1994) (discussing Unocal and its
progeny).
46 Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955; see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1367, 1390 (Del. 1995) (glossing the Unocal standard such that defendant boards and
directors must prove that the defensive tactics at issue are neither “preclusive [n]or
coercive”).
47 See, e.g., supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text; infra notes 48–70 and
accompanying text (exploring different situations in which the Delaware Supreme Court
adopts fact-intensive balancing tests).
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Unocal was far from the last instance of the Delaware Supreme
Court’s willingness to redefine the corporate contract between a
board and shareholders. In Moran, decided the same year as Unocal,
the Delaware Supreme Court ruled upon the fate of the “poison pill,”
at the time a new defensive innovation.48 The Moran opinion openly
acknowledged the necessity of redrafting the corporate contract in
response to the perceived potency of the pill,49 reflecting selfawareness as to the importance of the Delaware Supreme Court’s
role.50 The Moran court ultimately decided to validate the adoption of
the poison pill subject to the discretion of the court to invalidate the
pill when used in the future, once an actual takeover bid is launched.51
Acknowledging the impact of the Moran decision on corporate law,
one popular Corporate Law casebook observed that “[j]udicial
acceptance of shareholders’ right plans was a major evolutionary step
in U.S. corporate law.”52
Given the centrality of the Delaware courts in these high-stakes
corporate scuffles, it is unsurprising that the Delaware courts became
subject to heavy lobbying efforts.53 A considerable portion of this lobbying targeted the issue left open by Unocal and Moran: How much
discretion should a board be granted when maintaining a poison pill in
the face of a lucrative takeover bid? This question, whether the board
can “just say no,”54 was contemporaneously described by Professors
Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman as the “single most important
issue” regarding the market for corporate control.55 Following the
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48 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Poison pills are also
known as shareholders’ right plans and they come in different variations. The pill in
Moran, for example, set a threshold, where the acquisition of more than twenty percent of
shares by a single entity without the board’s consent triggered the heavy dilution of the
bidder’s control of the company by issuing massive amounts of rights to buy additional
shares at a great discount to all other shareholders. Id. at 1348–49.
49 Id. at 1348 (“This case presents to this Court for review the most recent defensive
mechanism in the arsenal of corporate takeover weaponry . . . .”).
50 Id. (“The validity of this mechanism has attracted national attention.”).
51 Id. at 1357 (“While we conclude for present purposes that the Household directors
are protected by the business judgment rule, that does not end the matter. The ultimate
response to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors’ actions at that
time . . . . Their use of the Plan will be evaluated when and if the issue arises.”).
52 W ILLIAM T. A LLEN , R EINIER K RAAKMAN & G UHAN S UBRAMANIAN ,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 522 (4th ed. 2012).
53 See, e.g., infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (exploring reactions by a major
corporate law firm to various decisions).
54 This now-familiar phrase refers to “the ultimate power of the board of a Delaware
corporation to block an unwanted takeover bid.” Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Just Say Never?”
Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren
Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 522 (1997).
55 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 258
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Delaware Chancery’s ruling in City Capital Associates v. Interco,
Inc.,56 implying that the ability to “just say no” ran afoul of Unocal’s
proportionality requirement,57 lobbying intensified.
Martin Lipton, leveraging his clout as legal counsel to some of the
nation’s largest corporations, sent a well-publicized client memo in an
effort to exert pressure on the Interco verdict.58 Lipton characterized
Interco as a “dagger aimed at the hearts of all Delaware corporations”59 and urged Delaware corporations to incorporate elsewhere,
sending the clear message that the Delaware Supreme Court ought to
revisit the issue.60
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,61 the Delaware
Supreme Court took up the invitation to revisit Interco and in so
doing redrew the lines of U.S. corporate control once again. The
Delaware Supreme Court characterized Interco as a “narrow and
rigid” interpretation of Unocal and ultimately permitted Time’s board
to reject a $200 per share bid from Paramount (nearly a sixty percent
premium over market price).62 Paramount led many to conclude that
boards could in fact “just say no,”63 a result many scholars deemed to
have a major impact on the market as a whole.64
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(1989) (discussing the lack of guidance offered for “what ‘threats’ will support preclusive
defenses by target managers”).
56 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988).
57 See id. at 799–800 (“[T]he board’s decision not to redeem the rights following the
amendment of the offer to $74 per share cannot be justified in the way Unocal requires.”).
58 The Interco Case, Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to clients
(Nov. 3, 1988), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7876-culled-martin-liptonpublicationspdf.
59 Id.
60 Id. (“New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania, among others, are far more desirable
states for incorporation than Delaware in this takeover era. Perhaps it is time to migrate
out of Delaware.”). In a second memo, published after Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury
Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988), Lipton continued with the same tone: “Unless
Delaware acts quickly to correct the Pillsbury decision, the only avenues open to the half
of major American companies incorporated in Delaware will be federal legislation . . . or
leaving Delaware for a more hospitable state of incorporation.” You Can’t Just Say No in
Delaware No More, Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Dec. 17, 1988),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7876-culled-martin-lipton-publicationspdf.
61 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
62 See id. at 1142, 1149, 1153. For the sake of comparison, consider the fact that in
Interco, the board rejected a $74 per share bid from Cardinal Acquisition Corporation,
with a much lower premium over market value than was offered in Paramount. See Capital
Associates v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d at 799–800.
63 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 859 n.4 (1993) (arguing that most
commentators believe that the Paramount decision reinforced the board’s ability to “just
say no”); Kahan, supra note 45, at 604.
64 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 878–79 (2002)
(explaining that in the aftermath of the Paramount decision “the value of M&A deals fell
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Later decisions made clear that the Delaware courts intended to
cement the proxy mechanism as an avenue for replacing directors via
the shareholder vote, notwithstanding the significant leeway granted
to boards under Paramount with respect to tender offers.65 This strict
preservation of the shareholder franchise came to a head in Blasius
Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,66 in which the Court of Chancery prevented the Atlas board from amending the company’s bylaws in order
to add two new board seats and then fill the newly created vacancies,
a maneuver clearly intended to preempt an attempt by one of its
shareholders to nominate a majority of new directors.67 Chancellor
Allen’s decision expressly acknowledged that it is the role of the
courts to set the boundaries of control over the company.68 The
Blasius court held that absent a “compelling justification,” boards
may not interfere with the proxy mechanism, thereby providing a protective counterweight to the board discretion afforded under
Unocal.69
When the dust settled, the outcome of 1980s Delaware jurisprudence was a new allocative equilibrium of control rights between
boards and shareholders.70 Given the malleability of Unocal’s bal-
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from its 1988 peak of $247 billion, to $108 billion in 1990, to $221 billion in 1989, and then
to $71 billion in 1991”).
65 The proxy mechanism allows shareholders to manifest their franchise by delegating
their voting power to another person or body. See Proxy Access, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL
INV., http://www.cii.org/proxy_access (last visited Oct. 18, 2018) (describing “proxy access”
as the ability for shareholders to offer their own candidates to election to the board).
66 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
67 The question, as Chancellor Allen described it, was whether the board “even if it is
acting with subjective good faith . . . may validly act for the principle purpose of preventing
the shareholders from electing a majority of new directors.” Id. at 658.
68 Id. at 660 (“A board’s decision to act to prevent the shareholders from creating a
majority of new board positions . . . does not involve the exercise of the corporation’s
power . . . rather, it involves allocation, between shareholders as a class and the board, of
effective power with respect to governance of the corporation.”). For a fascinating
description of the origin of the Blasius standard, see Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Story of Blasius
Industries v. Atlas Corp.: Keeping the Electoral Path to Takeovers Clear, in CORPORATE
LAW STORIES 243, 290–91 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
69 Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661 (“[T]he board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a
compelling justification for such action.”); see also Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d
1204, 1206–07 (Del. Ch. 1987) (emphasizing that director elections must be conducted
“with scrupulous fairness” and that the business judgment presumptions will not protect
obvious interference). Gilson questions the logic behind this policy decision to protect
shareholders’ right to vote but not to sell their shares: “[T]he lesson of Unocal’s first fifteen
years is that the Delaware Supreme Court’s march toward an unarticulated and unjustified
preference for elections over markets . . . has proven to be a failure.” Ronald J. Gilson,
Unocal Fifteen Years Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 512
(2001).
70 The Delaware courts continued, beyond the 1980s, to play an important role in
maintaining this allocation of control rights. See Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721
A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998) (rejecting a no-hand poison pill, i.e., an unremovable pill);
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ancing analysis, a great many control contests found their way to the
Delaware courts, repeatedly giving Delaware courts the final say on
shaping corporate behavior in the context of control tussles.71
B. The Changed Role of the Delaware Courts
In recent years there has been a noticeable decline in the role
played by the Delaware courts, such that their decisions no longer
mark the exclusive or final chapter over control rights conflicts. This
Section begins by illustrating the declined role of Delaware courts
with a few telling examples (Section I.B.1) before discussing hedge
fund activism as the most salient manifestation of extrajudicial corporate control dispute resolution (Section I.B.2). Finally, we show that
the Delaware courts’ reaction to its reduced role has also been generally welcoming in the context of cash-flow rights conflicts (Section
I.B.3).
1. Examples of the Decline: Poison Pills, Staggered Boards, Golden
Leashes, and Indices Exclusion
One of the most striking examples of the declined role of the
Delaware courts has been the marked shifts regarding poison pills and
staggered boards. As already noted, the Delaware courts created a
longstanding equilibrium in which target companies could—and often
did—maintain staggered boards and poison pills,72 thereby forcing
would-be acquirers to cope with these obstacles.73 Today, both stag41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 56 Side A
04/26/2019 09:52:55

Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000) (rejecting supermajority
bylaw provisions that de facto impaired the ability of stockholders to influence their
company’s policies via the ballot box); Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Del.
Ch. 1998) (rejecting a “dead hand” rights plan, which allowed only incumbent directors to
remove the pill).
71 Kahan and Kamar for this reason referred to Delaware law as “litigation intensive.”
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1232 (2001); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell,
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 1168, 1191 (1999) (“Delaware courts have consistently filled Delaware
jurisprudence with principles that are open-ended and unclear. The principles throughout
Delaware law contain terms which call for a case-specific assessment by the court.
Moreover, there is always some room for the chancery court’s equitable intervention.”).
72 See, e.g., Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prod. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1194–95 (Del. 2010)
(finding a bylaw invalid which impermissibly shortened directors’ three-year staggered
terms); see also supra Section I.A.
73 Bebchuk and others have demonstrated the power of a staggered board, showing
that an effective staggered board nearly doubles the likelihood that the average target will
remain independent. Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian, supra note 19, at 890–91 (“A
staggered board . . . offers a more powerful antitakeover defense than has previously been
recognized . . . . [They] make it extremely difficult for a hostile bidder to gain control over
the incumbents’ objections.”).
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gered boards and poison pills are fading from the market, leaving
managers far more vulnerable.74 The courts had no role in this watershed change, and the new reality turned obsolete an elaborated case
law setting the limits of antitakeover mechanisms’ design and usage.
Rather than lobby the Delaware courts directly for revision to the
doctrine governing staggered boards and poison pills, critics of these
takeover protection mechanisms simply exerted extrajudicial pressure
to de facto “rule” on the permissibility of these tools.
Staggered Boards. Consider first staggered boards.75 During the
first decade of the millennium, staggered boards were highly popular.
In 2000, 300 companies in the S&P 500 had staggered boards.76 In the
last half decade, the number of companies with staggered boards has
fallen dramatically.77 Much of this change was the product of cooperation between large pension funds and the Shareholder Rights Project
(SRP),78 a clinical program at Harvard Law School directed by
Professor Lucian Bebchuk.79 The SRP’s work during 2012–2014
focused on dismantling staggered boards.80 The campaign was tremendously successful and led to the declassification of around 100 S&P
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74 See infra note 86 and accompanying text (exploring directors’ hesitance to adopt
poison pills).
75 The de-staggering campaign’s dramatic influence on the market led to harsh
reactions from policy makers and practitioners. These reactions stress the importance of
the shift. See Daniel M. Gallagher & Joseph A. Grundfest, Did Harvard Violate Federal
Securities Law? The Campaign Against Classified Boards of Directors 3–4 (Rock Ctr. for
Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 199, 2014), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536586 (reflecting on the vast scope of
recent board declassification and thus the number of parties implicated in the debates over
whether the practice is harmful or not); Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple;
Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Feb. 26, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/26/bite-the-applepoison-the-apple-paralyze-the-company-wreck-the-economy (calling for effective action to
deal with the “misuse of shareholder power”).
76 Maxwell Murphy, Classified Boards Remain in the Crosshairs, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5,
2012, 11:51 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2012/09/05/classified-boards-remain-in-thecrosshairs.
77 See infra notes 81–82 (providing evidence of this decline).
78 Shareholder Rights Project, HARV. L. SCH., http://srp.law.harvard.edu/index.shtml
(last visited Oct. 20, 2018). These public pension funds had an aggregate value of assets
exceeding $400 billion and served over three million members. Id. The decline in the usage
of staggered boards started before the SRP. Institutional investors and other shareholders
opposed them in light of studies that found a negative relationship between staggered
boards and share price. Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The
Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 657 (2016) (reviewing evidence of this
correlation).
79 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk: Biographical Information, HARV. L. SCH., http://
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/bio.shtml (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
80 Shareholder Rights Project, supra note 78.
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500 and Fortune 500 companies by the end of 2014.81 As of January
2017, fewer than 50 of the corporations in the S&P 500 had staggered
boards.82
Poison Pills. Poison pills have similarly faced a sharp decline. In
2000, 299 companies in the S&P 500 had a poison pill in place.83 By
January 2017, that number shrank to 17.84 In the interim, and
continuing to this day, influential proxy advisors announced their
objection to the adoption of poison pills without shareholder approval
and threatened to recommend voting against the renomination of
directors who implement such pills.85 As a result, while boards are
free under Delaware law to adopt a poison pill, directors are, as a
practical matter, hesitant and constrained in their ability to do so,
fearing the wrath of proxy advisors and institutional investors.86 In
fact, in more than half of all contemporary hostile bids, a poison pill is
never implemented, even after the hostile bid has launched.87 This
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81 Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Toward Board Declassification in 100
S&P 500 and Fortune 500 Companies: The SRP’s Report for the 2012 and 2013 Proxy
Seasons, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 25, 2014, 9:12 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/02/25/toward-board-declassification-in-100-sp500-and-fortune-500-companies-the-srps-report-for-the-2012-and-2013-proxy-seasons.
82 Governance Trends at Russell 2000 Companies, BOARD MATTERS Q., Jan. 2017, at 4
https://www.ey.com/publication/vwluassetsdld/boardmattersquarterly_04552-161us_
january2017/$file/boardmattersquarterly_04552-161us_january2017.pdf (ninety-one
percent of S&P 500 companies have annual elections rather than staggered elections).
83 Michael Useem, The Ascent of Shareholder Monitoring and Strategic Partnering: The
Dual Functions of the Corporate Board, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 136, 143 (Thomas Clarke & Douglas Branson eds., 2012).
84 Id.
85 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Hedge Fund Activism: What Do We Know and Not Know?,
in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS
AND REGULATION 693, 699 (William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2015)
(noting that the rise of hedge fund activism is partly due to “the success of proxy advisors
in forcing target companies to place a short time limit on their ‘poison pills’ (usually one
year) under the threat that the proxy advisors would otherwise recommend a vote against
management’s nominees in any proxy contest”). The 2017 Glass Lewis proxy guidelines
advised shareholders to vote against “[a]ll board members who served at a time when a
poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval
within the prior twelve months.” GLASS LEWIS, 2017 PROXY PAPER GUIDELINES: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE GLASS LEWIS APPROACH TO PROXY ADVICE 15–16 (2017), http://
www.glasslewis.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Guidelines_US.pdf; see also Toonkel,
supra note 38.
86 See SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, 2009 TRENDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF
THE LARGEST US PUBLIC COMPANIES 24 (2009), https://capitalaberto.com.br/wp-content/
uploads/2012/04/General_Governance_Practices_1_.pdf (“Eighteen of the 40 institutional
shareholders surveyed would consider poison pill proposals on a case-by-case basis. Eleven
. . . would generally vote against poison pill proposals, but would consider the proposal on
a case-by-case basis under some circumstances. However, nine . . . are against poison pills
without exception.”).
87 See Subramanian, supra note 18, at 5 (“[I]n recent years 59% of companies without
pills have not put them in when a [hostile] bid is brought.”).
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reduction in the implementation and use of two of the most popular
(and powerful) takeover defenses has reshaped the corporate control
equilibrium almost entirely outside the Delaware courts.
Golden Leashes. The trend of market forces acting as the primary
engine reallocating corporate control has not been limited to staggered boards and poison pills. Another telling example is the rise and
fall of restrictions on “golden leashes,” a favorite tool of activist hedge
funds. A golden leash is an incentive compensation scheme granted to
a director nominated to a board by an activist shareholder, whereby
the director receives a compensatory reward from the hedge fund for
achieving certain activist-determined goals.88 In the early days of
golden leashes, dozens of public companies facing or expecting
activism campaigns reacted by restricting the use of golden leashes in
their corporate bylaws.89 From a legal standpoint, it is an open (and
intriguing) question as to whether golden leashes compromise the
fiduciary duties of the director “held” by the leash, so to speak.90 It is
an equally open question as to whether bylaws provisions prohibiting
such pay schemes are even permissible under Delaware law.91 However, as described below,92 these questions were not litigated in court
but rather were de facto decided through the exercise of discretionary
control rights.
In May of 2013, the law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
(Wachtell) issued a memorandum recommending corporations adopt
a bylaw prohibiting golden leashes.93 Soon thereafter, thirty-two com-
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88 Yaron Nili, Servants of Two Masters? The Feigned Hysteria over Activist-Paid
Directors, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 509, 512 (2016); see also Gregory H. Shill, The Golden
Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1246, 1249–50 (2017)
(describing the dual compensation structure of the “golden leash” and its use to “enlist an
unaffiliated outsider as a candidate for director”).
89 See infra note 91 (exploring the interplay between golden leashes and reactive
changes to corporate bylaws).
90 See Shill, supra note 88, at 1274 (introducing some of the issues surrounding golden
leashes insofar as they intersect with potential fiduciary duty violations).
91 Id. at 1246. Commentators have observed that Delaware judges are skeptical of
golden leashes as sources of potential conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Shill, supra note 88, at
1276–86 (surveying cases in which Delaware judges closely scrutinize golden leash
arrangements when assessing whether directors violated their duties of loyalty). Some
leading corporate law scholars have gone further, likening golden leashes to bribery, and
urging that they be banned. See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Can Corporate Directors Take
Third Party Pay from Hedge Funds?, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Apr. 8, 2013), http://
www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2013/04/can-corporate-directorstake-third-party-pay-from-hedge-funds.html (“If this nonsense is not illegal, it ought to
be.”).
92 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
93 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Strong Response to Paying Board Nominees, N.Y.
TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 10, 2013, 3:13 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/astrong-response-to-paying-board-nominees (“[T]he memo proposes that company boards
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panies did so.94 In response, the proxy advisor Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) recommended that shareholders withhold
votes from the members of the Nominating and Governance
Committee of Provident (NGCP), one of the firms that had adopted
the bylaw. In turn, NGCP’s director nominees received a withhold
vote of thirty-four percent, signaling widespread investor dissatisfaction.95 ISS later threatened more withhold recommendations with
respect to firms adopting golden leash restrictions. By May 2014,
twenty-eight of the thirty-two companies that had adopted anti-golden
leash bylaws had removed them,96 and, by January 2016, only three
issuers retained the bylaw.97 Here again, a complex and pressing corporate governance issue was addressed entirely outside litigation,
resolved instead through pressure exerted by market actors (i.e., institutional investors and proxy advisors).
Indices Exclusion. As of this writing, yet another extrajudicial
change of major legal consequence is brewing among private actors.
Certain shareholder advocates are seeking to eliminate the increasing
use of multi-class share structures that limit or eliminate the voting
rights of certain classes of shareholders by excluding issuers of multiclass shares from stock indices.98 Shortly after Snap, Inc.’s $3.4 billion
initial public offering (IPO) in March 2017, wherein Snap controversially offered common stock without voting rights, S&P announced its
intent to bar companies with “multi-class share structures” from inclu-
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consider adopting a bylaw prohibiting shareholder activitsts from compensating director
nominees.”).
94 Cain et al., supra note 78, at 672; see also id. at 699 (“[T]he golden leash . . . and the
bylaw proposed in response to it [are] . . . case stud[ies] of corporate governance
innovation in contemporary capital markets.”).
95 Id. at 673.
96 Id. at 653.
97 Id. at 667.
98 Shares of companies that have gone through an initial public offering are frequently
included in indices based on criteria that have nothing to do with corporate governance.
For instance, the committee reviewing applications for inclusion in the S&P 500 index
determines a company’s eligibility with eight primary criteria: domicile, listing on a
qualified exchange, organizational structure and share type, market capitalization,
liquidity, investable weight factor, financial viability, and length of time trading publicly.
See S&P DOW JONES INDICES, S&P U.S. INDICES METHODOLOGY 5–8 (Sept. 2018), https://
us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology-sp-us-indices.pdf. Many passive
investors have a policy of automatically buying shares of every company included in a
given index. See Madison Marriage, Passive Funds Take Third of US Market, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4cdf2f88-7695-11e6-b60a-de4532d5ea35
(noting the increased market share of passive index-tracking funds). Because passive
investors make up a substantial portion of the investors that own and trade U.S. firms,
exclusion from indices can result in a significant loss of investment capital. Id.

41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 58 Side B

04/26/2019 09:52:55

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU203.txt

282

unknown

Seq: 20

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

26-APR-19

9:30

[Vol. 94:263

sion in the S&P 500 index.99 This important policy change came only
after S&P consulted with the institutional investors that serve as its
clients.100 Whatever one’s views of the merits of multi-class share
structures,101 S&P’s attempt to impinge on the contracting freedom
typically awarded to private parties at the IPO stage, rather than
waiting to challenge this behavior in court or lobby legislators, is
telling. This is yet another extraordinary illustration of extrajudicial
actors replacing the Delaware courts (and corporate law more generally) as arbiters of consequential issues of corporate law and
governance.102
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99 While new companies with multiple share classes will not be permitted to join the
S&P 500 moving forward, companies already listed on the exchange with multiple share
classes will be able to remain. See Nicole Bullock, Investors Hail S&P 500 Move over
Multiple Class Shares, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0a44190076ca-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71. Another major index provider, FTSE Russell, announced a
similar restriction on low-voting stock of the kind at issue in the Snap, Inc. IPO. See Abe
M. Friedman et al., S&P and FTSE Russell on Exclusion of Companies with Multi-Class
Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/08/05/sp-and-ftse-russell-on-exclusion-of-companies-withmulti-class-shares (noting that inclusion in the Russell indices now requires a firm to have
at least five percent of voting rights in the hands of unrestricted public shareholders).
100 See Friedman et al., supra note 99 (“Over the past week, two of the world’s largest
index providers have announced decisions to partially or fully exclude companies with
multiple-class share structures from their indices. These new policies [were] made after
substantive consultation with index users and other stakeholders . . . .”); see also E-mail
from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to Members of the
MSCI Equity Index Comm. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/
correspondence/8-3-17%20CII%20response%20to%20MSCI%20Consutation.pdf (“[W]e
believe that major index providers have a critical role to play in preventing non-voting and
multi-class equity structures from gaining unstoppable momentum.”).
101 See generally Andrea Tan & Benjamin Robertson, Why Investors Are Fretting over
Dual-Class Shares, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (July 10, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-10/why-investors-are-fretting-over-dual-classshares-quicktake-q-a (describing some of shareholders’ concerns with multi-class share
structures).
102 Still outside of the courtroom, shareholders successfully managed to change public
corporations’ bylaws in order to implement “majority vote” requirements in the election of
directors and “proxy-access” shareholder proposals, thereby gaining additional control
rights. A majority vote provision requires that a director receive the support of a majority
of shareholders for reappointment, as opposed to a plurality vote, which only requires
getting more votes than the competing candidate (if one is even present). See, e.g.,
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
34–35 (2015), http://shearman.uberflip.com/i/581509-2015-corporate-governance-executivecompensation-survey/0? (describing the “dramatic” increase in the use of majority, as
opposed to plurality, voting in director elections between 2006 and 2015). A proxy-access
provision requires boards to include shareholder-nominated director candidates in
companies’ annual proxy statements. For an overview of the significance and success of
votes adding proxy access provisions to firm bylaws, see SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP,
2016 PROXY SEASON REVIEW (July 11, 2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/
Publications/SC_Publication_2016_Proxy_Season_Review.pdf; see also Lisa M. Fairfax,
The Model Business Corporation Act at Sixty: Shareholders and Their Influence, LAW &
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2. Hedge Fund Activism and Extrajudicial Resolution of Corporate
Conflict
Section I.B.1 discussed several symptoms of the death of corporate law. In this Section, we turn to the mechanics of hedge fund
activism, a major extrajudicial force allowing market participants to
sidestep the Delaware courts.
Hedge fund activism constitutes a significant channel through
which shareholders increasingly settle controversies with management
almost entirely outside the courtroom. Hedge funds agitate for corporate reform on a case-by-case basis, with institutional investors largely
determining the fate of these initiatives via the exercise of their voting
rights.103 Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged
as a viable, and prominent, corporate governance mechanism.104
Activist funds seek to secure value for shareholders (and boost profits
for investors in the funds themselves) by nudging, with varying
degrees of force, corporations to act in certain ways.105 To this end,
hedge funds have promoted, among other initiatives, stock buybacks,
dividend distributions, spin-offs of major units, mergers or sales of the
company, and replacements of management.106 In 2015, 556 activist
hedge funds held a total of $142 billion in assets under management.107 Since 2006, nearly one of every six S&P 500 corporations has
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CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 19, 25 (“In recent years not only has there been an
increase in proxy fights, but there also has been an increase in the relative success of such
fights.”).
103 For helpful background, see generally Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and
the New Hedge Fund Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 682–85 (2007)
(discussing the legal backdrop of hedge fund activism and its relationship to non-activist
shareholder control).
104 For a description of the rise of hedge fund activism and some of the ways in which
hedge fund activism is distinguishable from other institutional activism, see, for example,
Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review, 4 FOUND. &
TRENDS FIN. 185, 186–87 (2010) (arguing that on average, activist hedge funds have
stronger financial incentives to increase a firm’s profits and face fewer conflicts of interest
than institutional investors).
105 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2007) (analyzing “the implications of
the rise of hedge funds for corporate governance and corporate control”).
106 Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 190–91 (2015); id. at
163 (suggesting that “a novel market mechanism, a ‘super hedge fund,’ would maintain the
benefits of hedge fund activism, while curbing its downsides”); see also Brav, Jiang & Kim,
supra note 104, at 198 (displaying a distribution of activist funds’ stated objectives).
107 TOPPAN VITE NEW YORK, ACTIVIST INVESTING: IMPACT ON 2016 DEALMAKING 7
(2016), http://www.thedeal.com/pdf/ActivistInvesting.pdf. For the 2016 data, see SULLIVAN
& CROMWELL LLP, 2016 U.S. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 7–9
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_2016_U.S._
Shareholder_Activism_Review_and_Analysis.pdf (noting a drop in assets under
management in 2016 for activist funds, after rapid growth between 2013 and 2015).
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108 AJAY KHORANA ET AL., CITI CORP. & INV. BANKING DIV., RISING TIDE OF GLOBAL
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 4 (2013), https://thetyee.ca/Documents/2014/08/06/Citi-FSGShareholder-Activism-November-2013.pdf.
109 C.A. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
110 The “two-tiered” pill at issue triggered at 10% for activist Schedule 13D filers and
20% for passive Schedule 13G filers. See id. at *1, *22–23.
111 Id. at *1 (noting Sotheby’s adoption of the pill in response to increasing threats from
activists).
112 Id. at *2.
113 Id. at *39–40, *45–46 (declaring that the pill was not draconian nor an unreasonable
response).
114 Press Release, Sotheby’s, Sotheby’s and Third Point Reach Agreement (May 5,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/823094/000119312514183175/d723453
dex998.htm.
115 Id. (detailing the terms of the agreement reached).
116 Fontevecchia, supra note 27 (noting the importance of ISS giving Loeb its blessing).
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been the target of an activist campaign, and the numbers continue to
rise.108
When conflicts between hedge funds and targeted management
do reach a court, judicial intervention is unlikely to be decisive. That
is to say, when hedge funds initiate a legal procedure, it is often meant
to either place additional pressure on the management or address a
protective measure taken by the target board, rather than to secure a
particular disposition. Consider Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,109
wherein defendant Sotheby’s adopted a two-tiered poison pill110 specifically intended to thwart activist hedge funds.111 Third Point, an
activist hedge fund, filed a motion to preliminarily enjoin Sotheby’s
pill.112 In denying the motion, the court found that Third Point did not
have a reasonable probability of success on the merits, since Third
Point posed a legally cognizable threat to Sotheby’s corporate interests and that its response was proportional under the Unocal
standard.113
Third Point granted Sotheby’s board an ostensible victory in
court, but in reality, this victory was decidedly hollow. In May 2014,
after a grueling proxy fight, Sotheby’s and Third Point reached an
agreement whereby Sotheby’s expanded its board to fifteen members
and reserved three seats for Third Point candidates, including Third
Point’s founder Dan Loeb.114 In addition, Sotheby’s agreed to remove
its poison pill, thus allowing Third Point to raise its stake in Sotheby’s
to fifteen percent.115 This deal was struck just one day before
Sotheby’s annual meeting, reflecting the immense pressure Sotheby’s
shareholders and ISS exerted on the board.116
This result is not unique to Sotheby’s. In fact, despite the court’s
approval of management’s unilateral adoption of anti-activist poison
pills in Third Point, corporations appear to be increasingly settling
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with activists instead of litigating the merits of a dispute.117 And even
more telling, the institutional investors who are dissatisfied with such
settlements are not suing boards in courts for breach of fiduciary
duties, but rather voice their dissatisfaction publicly or directly toward
boards.118
3. Delaware Courts’ Welcoming of Market Primacy
There is little to suggest that the Delaware courts have actively
resisted the move toward extrajudicial market actors playing the predominant role in resolving corporate disputes. To the contrary, the
courts often seem to accept and acknowledge the change.119 One clear
manifestation of this judicial behavior is the increasing deference to
both independent directors and the shareholder vote as a tool to legitimize challenged corporate decisionmaking over cash flow rights,
illustrated by the recent holdings in Cornerstone,120 Corwin,121 and
MFW.122
In Cornerstone, the Delaware Supreme Court held that independent directors facing a lawsuit challenging a controlling-owner conflicted transaction are protected by the business judgment rule and
entitled to a motion to dismiss, absent specifically pled loyalty
claims.123 The practical result of granting motions to dismiss is
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117 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 102, at 22 (“The percentage of
settlement agreements that have been filed with the SEC for 2016 campaigns to date as
compared to the total number of completed activist campaigns has increased significantly
from 2015 . . . .”); Jay Frankl & Steve Balet, The Rise of Settled Proxy Fights, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 22, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/the-rise-of-settled-proxy-fights (“Of the 110 proxy
fights in 2016, 50 ended in settlement, the most we have ever seen in a given year.”); see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Agency Cost of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted
Majorities, and the Public Morality 2–5, 10 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 373, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3058319 (exploring the settlement process
and its potential costs to non-activist shareholders).
118 See Coffee, supra note 117, at 23–25; J.P. MORGAN, THE 2017 PROXY SEASON 3
(2017), https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320739681811.pdf (noting that index investors
have expressed frustration with the number of rapid settlements, “viewing them as a
usurpation of their right to elect directors” and have “publicly urged portfolio companies
to solicit their feedback before settling,” as “[f]ailure to do so risks investors voting against
incumbent directors following any unacceptable settlement”).
119 Note, however, our saying that the court has “accepted” the move to extrajudicial
market actors is not the same as saying that the court has caused this change. See supra
notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
120 Leal v. Meeks (In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. Stockholder Litig.), 115 A.3d
1173, 1183 (Del. 2015).
121 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306 (Del. 2015).
122 In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 502–03 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom.
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
123 In re Cornerstone, 115 A.3d at 1183 (noting that protection under the business
judgement rule is initially presumed for independent directors, even in controlling-owner
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avoiding discovery, relieving directors of the need to answer a disgruntled shareholder’s questions, and exempting the directors from
judicial disciplining. Instead, this disciplining role is transferred to the
market, where institutional investors can leverage their control rights
to punish directors they believe improperly approved an unfair conflicted transaction.124
In Corwin, the court issued another market-centric ruling,
holding that a merger approved by a majority of fully informed and
disinterested shareholders is subject to the deferential business judgment rule, even if the corporation’s directors were negligent in the
stages preceding the closing or suffered from a conflict of interest.125
The court stressed the advantage engrained in voting rights as compared to litigation: “When . . . disinterested equity owners . . . can
easily protect themselves at the ballot box by simply voting no, the
utility of a litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs
to stockholders in the form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risktaking than it promises in terms of benefits to them.”126 Fortifying
Corwin’s cleansing effect, Singh held in part that “[w]hen the business
judgment rule standard of review is invoked because of a vote, dismissal is typically the result.”127 Delaware courts have followed
Corwin and announced that fully informed and uncoerced share-
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transactions). This ruling reversed the Court of Chancery’s finding that entire fairness was
the applicable standard with respect to independent directors. Id. at 1175.
124 See Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance,
40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 13 (2015) (“Over the past decade, though, the support mainstream
institutional shareholders have increasingly afforded to ‘activist’ hedge funds specializing
in buying up sizeable stakes in target companies and agitating for change has meant that
the activist agenda has had an increasingly pronounced influence in the boardroom.”);
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 807
(2007) (“Today, shareholders have much greater ability to act in concert and to influence
boards as a result of a variety of developments that include the increasing clout of
institutional investors like pension funds and mutual funds.”).
125 Corwin, 125 A.3d at 305–06, 312. Practically, this ruling allows shareholders to ratify
a breach of Revlon duties. Id. at 312 (noting that Revlon was intended to apply to preclosing disputes).
126 Id. at 313.
127 Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016). The court explained that
dismissal is likely upon invocation of Corwin’s protection because, at that point, the
plaintiff’s only route to victory is to allege waste, and as a practical matter, “the vestigial
waste exception has long had little real-world relevance.” Id. at 152; see also In re
Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 12152-VCL, 2017 WL 898382
(Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2017). The Columbia Pipeline court “(i) found that the stockholders had
approved the transaction in a fully informed vote; (ii) held that, as a result, under Corwin,
the business judgment rule standard of review applied; and (iii) dismissed the case.” Gail
Weinstein & Warren S. de Wied, Columbia Pipeline: Directors’ Self-Interest Does Not
Exclude “Cleansing” Under Corwin, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/03/columbia-pipelinedirectors-self-interest-does-not-exclude-cleansing-under-corwin.
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holder approval will render business judgment rule protection
“irrebuttable.”128
In the context of controlled corporations, MFW provides yet
another clear example of the Delaware courts deferring to a shareholder vote when evaluating a challenged transaction.129 MFW concerned a classic going-private merger, wherein the controller, Ron
Perelman, sought to take his company private by buying out the
minority shareholders.130 Under the governing standard at the time of
MFW, controllers seeking to enact a going-private merger were subject to entire fairness scrutiny, with the ability merely to shift the
burden of proof to plaintiffs if the controller made use of either a fully
functioning special committee of independent directors or a requirement that a majority of the minority shareholders approve the
merger.131 However, MFW contained a crucial factual wrinkle:
Perelman conditioned the transaction on the use of both of these protections.132 Ruling as a matter of first impression, then Chancellor
Strine held that a transaction conditioned upon the approval of both
an empowered, dutiful special committee and an informed, uncoerced
minority shareholder vote, rather than simply one or the other, is entitled to business judgment review, rather than a simple burden shift
within entire fairness review.133 In so doing, MFW offered a path to
extract the court from the searching entire fairness review, so long as
the parties involved had the opportunity to exercise their control
rights.134
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128 See, e.g., In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 738 (Del. Ch. 2016);
In re OM Grp., Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 11216-VCS, 2016 WL 5929951, at *24
(Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2016); Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *2
(Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016).
129 In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn v. M
& F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
130 Id. at 499.
131 See id. at 500; Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 (Del. 1994)
(holding that entire fairness review governs cash-out mergers by a controlling shareholder,
and that the controller bears the burden of proof initially but can shift the burden to the
plaintiff with either approval by an independent committee or the majority of the minority
vote).
132 In re MFW, 67 A.3d at 499–500.
133 Id. at 517, 535.
134 Indeed, following the MFW decision more than ninety percent of the going-private
mergers accepted the court’s offer of a path to the business judgment rule, with controlling
owners adding a majority-of-the-minority condition to the already common use of a special
committee approval. See Fernán Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and
Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW 17 (Mar. 5,
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3105169.
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Continuing in this same vein, Delaware courts have met recent
appraisal actions with an increasing tendency to defer to deal price as
the dispositive indicator of fair value, again suggesting that market
actors are better positioned to resolve a corporate cash flow conflict
than Delaware chancellors.135
Relaxed judicial scrutiny and increased reliance on market forces
have also appeared outside deal ratification and appraisal, perhaps
most notably in the contexts of “disclosure-only” settlements. In the
deal litigation context, plaintiffs often obtain settlements that do not
provide for money damages but rather only require defendants to
make a few trivial disclosures.136 These settlements are problematic
not only because they waste corporate resources in the form of attorneys’ fees, but also because they can result in sweeping releases for
the defendants from potentially meritorious litigation.137 In Trulia,138
the Delaware court declined to approve settlements relating to so-
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135 In a recent decision, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s
refusal to defer to the deal price on the basis of perceived “regulatory uncertainty.” DFC
Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 387 (Del. 2017). However, the
court stopped short of adopting a full-on presumption of the accuracy of the deal price. Id.
at 363. A similar decision was also reached in Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven
Master Fund, 177 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. 2017) (finding that the trial court erred in giving a firm’s
current stock price zero weight in an appraisal determination). For additional similar
decisions, see Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL
6164771, at *38 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (“[W]here the sales process is thorough, effective,
and free from any spectre of self-interest or disloyalty, the deal price is a relevant measure
of fair value.”); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP, 2015
WL 4540443, at *20 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“Neither [a discounted cash flow nor a
comparables] approach yields a reliable measure of fair value in this case. Instead, I
conclude that the Merger price offers the best indication of fair value.”); Merlin Partners
LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., C.A. No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *41 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30,
2015) (“Nonetheless, because the Merger price appears to be the best estimate of value,
the Court will put full weight on that price.”); see also Albert Choi & Eric Talley,
Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE
& FIN. REG. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/06/appraising-themerger-price-appraisal-rule (“[E]ven in deals that engage a single bidder in bilateral
negotiations, courts increasingly accord the merger price ‘substantial evidentiary weight.’”
(quoting In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *15
(Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015))).
136 See Peter J. Walsh Jr. & Aaron R. Sims, Delaware Insider: Trulia and the Demise of
“Disclosure Only” Settlements in Delaware, BUS. L. TODAY (Feb. 2016), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/2016/02/delaware-insider-201602.
authcheckdam.pdf (noting the historical prevalence of such settlements, despite their
questionable utility for non-activist shareholders).
137 See id. (critiquing the settlements for disincentivizing plaintiff’s attorneys from
pursuing meritorious claims due to the potential uncertainty of trial outcome, opting
instead for a certain settlement).
138 In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
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called disclosure-only class actions.139 Chancellor Bouchard repeatedly returned to the strong support of the shareholder vote for the
merger at issue, suggesting that shareholder ratification bolstered the
grounds for dismissal.140 The Delaware courts thus increasingly
appear to doubt that additional fine-grained disclosures benefit
sophisticated shareholders and, as a result, have dramatically curtailed
disclosure-only settlements (and suits).141
In sum, the increased deference of the Delaware courts to market
actors reflects the Delaware courts’ correct understanding that sophisticated shareholders are better positioned to adjudge the merits of
board decisions and to discipline disloyalty and incompetence. As our
theory presented in the next Part will show, Delaware’s retreat in the
context of cash-flow conflicts is not purely the result of judicial volition,142 but rather a necessity in order for Delaware to preserve its
place as the leading state of incorporation.
II
A THEORY

ROLE OF COURTS
CORPORATE DISPUTES

OF THE

IN

RESOLVING

Part I chronicled the declined role of Delaware courts, which
epitomizes the broader death of corporate law. What has led to the
death of corporate law and why? This Part presents a novel theory
through which we can explain the underlying market dynamics and
provide answers.
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139 Id. at 907–08 (denying the settlement because it failed to provide shareholders with
material information, rendering it neither fair nor reasonable). Recent data concerning
litigation rates imply that these decisions had a major impact in deterring litigation, at least
in the short run. See, e.g., Meredith E. Kotler & Vanessa C. Richardson, Disclosure-Only
Settlements in M&A Litigation, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(Sept. 5, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/05/disclosure-only-settlements-inma-litigation (“[O]nly 64 percent of M&A deals faced litigation during the first six months
of 2016, which is the lowest rate since 2009.”).
140 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 889 (“Trulia’s stockholders overwhelmingly supported the
transaction. Of the Trulia shares that voted, 99.15% voted in favor of the transaction.”).
141 See id. at 898 (“[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to
be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a
plainly material misrepresentation or omission . . . .”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith
& Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation:
An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 561–62, 585–87
(2015) (arguing that disclosure-only settlements produce no economic benefit to the
stockholder class as evidenced by the lack of a relationship between disclosure-settlements,
which should ostensibly disclose information of sufficient import to alter shareholder votes,
and actual changes in shareholder voting following such disclosures).
142 See supra note 8 (collecting scholarly work reporting that the retreat reflects judicial
volition).
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A. The Role of Courts in an Incomplete Corporate Contract
The basic corporate contract between boards and shareholders is
always “incomplete.”143 Suppose Marco, an entrepreneur with an idea
for a social media business, and Sarah, a venture capitalist (VC)
looking for promising investments, enter a contract wherein Sarah
provides financing to Marco in exchange for a portion of the firm’s
future profits. At its core, the bargain is financial: Sarah provides cash
to Marco now in exchange for Marco’s promise to generate more cash
in the future. However, the contract does not specify how Marco will
generate more cash in the future. The future also necessarily entails
uncertainty, such as the emergence of new competitors requiring
recalibration of the business plan. Since Marco and Sarah cannot contractually enumerate every possible future decision,144 their contract is
incomplete.
This “incomplete-contracts” approach has generated a substantial
literature.145 In their seminal work on contract design, Professors
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143 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (noting that shareholders and the
board agree to an allocation of control and cash-flow rights, rather than specifics as to how
the firm should be managed). For helpful background on “incomplete contracts,” see
generally Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 691–93, 696–97 (1986)
(arguing that purchasing residual rights—everything that was not specified in a contract—
sometimes offers a lower transaction cost method of contracting as opposed to specifying
all possible contingencies). For work applying, either implicitly or explicitly, the
“incomplete contract” framework in the corporate context, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure, 25 J.
CORP. L. 1, 27, 27–29 (1999) (discussing the role of common law courts in filling gaps in
incomplete contracts, including corporate charters); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (discussing the
flexible, contractual relationship between firms and their investors enabled by corporate
law); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual
Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 190 (1993) (analyzing the desirability of flexible, as
opposed to mandatory, rules in the context of corporate governance, allowing for
innovation in charters).
144 See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of
Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 190 (2005) (“To a lawyer, a contract may
be incomplete in failing to describe the obligations of the parties in each possible state of
the world.”).
145 For more background on the concept of incomplete contracting, see generally
Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial
Contracting, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 473 (1992) (discussing incomplete contracts in the
context of capital structuring and financing decisions); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87
(1989) (applying a law and economics framework to the development of default rules for
filling gaps in incomplete contracts, and arguing that these defaults should sometimes
deviate from what the parties may have bargained for had they considered the issue ex
ante); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (discussing the contractarian case for director
primacy); Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and

41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 63 Side A

04/26/2019 09:52:55

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\94-2\NYU203.txt

May 2019]

unknown

Seq: 29

THE DEATH OF CORPORATE LAW

26-APR-19

9:30

291

Robert Scott and George Triantis suggest that parties entering an
incomplete contract will seek to minimize the sum of the ex ante cost
of drafting and agreeing upon the contractual terms, along with the ex
post cost of litigating items left unresolved by the contract.146 Subsequent work by Triantis and Professor Albert Choi engaged the question as to how parties will design an incomplete contract in the
corporate context, framing the ex ante drafting versus ex post litigation costs as a balance between vagueness and specificity of contractual terms.147 Most recently, Scott along with Professors Ronald
Gilson and Charles Sable, introduced a model in which parties in an
incomplete contract prefer more specific terms when the objective at
issue is more certain, and conversely prefer vagueness when uncertainty renders a court the most convenient ex post arbiter.148
Notwithstanding these thoughtful treatments of incomplete contracting models, the literature has left a conspicuous gap. There has
been little attempt to address the role of courts and their use by parties in the context of a preexisting incomplete contract—particularly
in the corporate governance context.149 In other words, while existing
models focus on the design of the contractual relationship, we are concerned with the role courts play in an already extant incomplete contract and how the parties will, or will not, use courts when they have
the right to do so.150 This Article attempts to fill this gap in the litera-
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Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91 (2000)
(critiquing scholarly analysis which focuses solely on the (in)completeness of contracts at
the expense of discussing their complexity and discussing the resultant implications for
courts deciding how to interpret contractual provisions); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of SelfEnforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1667–72 (2003) (arguing that
parties often can abide by and often intentionally write indefinite, incomplete contracts
due to the prevalence of concerns about “reciprocal fairness” among the population).
146 Scott & Triantis, supra note 144, at 188–90 (discussing the refinement of the broad
category of transaction costs into more nuanced concepts of ex ante and ex post costs).
147 Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of
Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 855 (2010) (“Our objective throughout is to
demonstrate the possibility that vagueness may be used strategically to resolve information
obstacles to efficient contracting.”).
148 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sable & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 56–57 (2014).
149 Scholarship specific to corporate law has emphasized the importance of courts in
enforcing the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate
Control and Credible Commitment, 43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 119, 123–29 (2015)
(characterizing the duty of loyalty as a partial solution to the credible-commitment
problem faced by controlled companies).
150 In our theory, judicial interpretation of corporate contracts is not a future cost that
the parties consider at the drafting stage, but rather a tribunal that the parties may, or may
not, turn to once disputes arise. Notably, this tribunal is capable of creating default rules
that may be designed either to codify or impede the parties’ ability to resolve corporate
disputes extrajudicially. It is important to note that while our aim in this Article is
primarily to provide a theory that explains the conditions under which principals and
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ture, beginning with a theory to explain when a principal and an agent
might prefer to use a court for dispute resolution, and when they
might, alternatively, prefer to use discretionary control rights.
B. Agent Costs, Principal Costs, and Adjudicatory Costs
Since Marco and Sarah cannot contractually enumerate all possible future decisions, they must instead decide ex ante how to allocate the value generated by the firm (cash flow rights) and the
decisionmaking authority (control rights) over broad classes of decisions—this is the essence of corporate governance. Parties to an
incomplete contract acknowledge that conflicts as to the allocation of
control rights and cash flow rights might also arise in the future. When
deciding ex ante how to resolve future disputes arising out of unspecified eventualities in an incomplete contract, parties generally have
two options: (1) Assign decisionmaking authority to either the principal, agent, or some combination thereof; or, (2) assign authority to a
neutral third party.151
Consider the first option: Parties can assign authority over some
broad class of decisions to the agent, the principal, or some combination of both. For example, returning to the Marco-Sarah hypothetical,
it may make sense for the parties to assign decisionmaking authority
to Marco, the entrepreneur, over day-to-day business operations
because he has superior expertise and information regarding the business itself. And it may make sense for Marco and Sarah to share decisionmaking authority over setting Marco’s compensation because
Sarah might not trust Marco to self-impose a fair level of compensa41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B
04/26/2019 09:52:55

agents will or will not turn to judicial resolution in the context of a preexisting corporate
contract, our theory also has the potential to inform future discussions of contract design.
However, for purposes of clarity and concision, we leave for another day the question of
how parties might apply our theory to contract design.
151 Because our example of Marco and Sarah abstracts from reality in the interest of
conveying the essence of our theory, it is important to make a clarification as to the
identity of the agent. The identity of the agent changes depending on whether one is
considering a widely held or a controlled firm. If a firm is widely held, the agent is the
board and management, whereas if the company has a controlling shareholder, the
controller herself will be the agent (in the latter case, the minority shareholders are the
principal). See Goshen & Squire, supra note 33, at 785 (describing the distinctions between
principals and agents). One way of understanding this difference is to consider the fact that
in a widely held company, the competence and conflict costs of the board and managers
will lead to agency costs in light of the limited ability of dispersed shareholders to control
this behavior (for example, due to rational apathy or collective action problems); on the
other hand, in a controlled company, the controller’s competence and conflict costs are the
cause for greatest concern vis-à-vis agency costs, because the controller is capable of
forcing the company (including its board and management) to behave as the controller
sees fit. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 33, at 581–82 (explaining the phenomenon of
agency costs).
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152 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 33, at 770 (explaining the principal-cost theory that
states that a firm’s optimal governance structure will minimize total control costs—the sum
of principal costs and agent costs).
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 See id. at 785–90 (discussing competence costs).
156 Id. at 791.
157 See id. at 785–90.
158 We assume that the parties have chosen a court as the neutral third party rather than
an administrative agency or private arbitrator. The analysis, however, would be the same.
159 See Goshen & Squire, supra note 33, at 798–801 (explaining the function of dutyenforcement rights in corporate governance).
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tion. The efficiency of any specific allocation of control rights between
Marco and Sarah will depend on the balance of “control costs” associated with the agent’s exercise of control rights (“agent costs”) and the
principal’s exercise of control rights (“principal costs”).152
There are two subcategories within the broad umbrella of control
costs: competence costs and conflict costs.153 Competence costs arise
when the party exercising control makes an honest mistake that
reduces firm value.154 These costs drive the decision to grant Marco
decisionmaking authority over day-to-day business operations, as
Marco’s superior expertise and access to information imply he will
make fewer honest mistakes than Sarah (i.e., agent competence costs
are lower than principal competence costs).155 Conflict costs, on the
other hand, arise when the party exercising control takes a valuereducing action out of self-interest.156 These costs motivate the decision to split decisionmaking authority over Marco’s compensation
between the two parties—if Marco is a self-interested agent (i.e., there
is a risk of high agent conflict costs), he may try to compensate himself
at a level significantly above the fair value of his service.157
Consider now the second option for resolving incomplete contract disputes: The parties can assign decisionmaking authority to a
neutral third party, such as a court.158 Returning to Marco and Sarah,
the parties might decide that a court should determine whether to
permit the firm to enter a transaction with a different firm also owned
by Marco—a “self-dealing” transaction—according to whether the
court deems the transaction “fair,” however determined. The only
control right that Sarah, the principal, would retain is the right to petition the court to prevent a self-dealing transaction of which she disapproves—a “duty-enforcement right.”159
Herein lies our theory’s critical observation: Just as exercise of
control by the principal or agent can impose control costs, so too can
exercise of control by the third-party adjudicator. We call these judicially imposed control costs “adjudicatory costs.” Adjudicatory costs
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can arise in a variety of different contexts, related to both competence
and conflict. Courts given responsibility to adjudicate disputes over
day-to-day business decisions may lack the expertise and information
about the firm’s business that the agents and principal possess. If a
court inefficiently blocks a value-enhancing transaction due to lack of
information or lack of the expertise necessary to evaluate this information, this behavior imposes adjudicatory competence costs. Concerns with adjudicatory competence costs animate the business
judgment rule, which requires courts to defer to disinterested,
informed decisions by directors and managers.160
Assuming a professionalized, honest judiciary, we can expect
adjudicatory conflict costs related to judges’ conflicts of interest to be
minimal. We must extend our theory away from the stylized singlemanager/single-investor firm to understand how adjudicatory conflict
costs impact the parties’ preference of whether to enlist a court.
Instead of a single principal, assume a firm with thousands of principal
investors, each of whom owns a very small portion of the firm’s equity
and holds a diversified portfolio of investments. As before, the parties
may delegate to a court authority to review challenged conflicted
transactions. But because the principals each hold a very small stake
in the firm, they each lack the incentives necessary to vigorously prosecute the lawsuits.161 The principals, therefore, have an incentive to
delegate authority to the court to award fees to their counsel, hoping
that entrepreneurial “private attorneys general,” motivated by the
promise of such fees, will drive the litigation.162 However, these attorneys’ incentives may depart from those of their clients163—particularly
41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 64 Side B
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160 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–13 (Del. 1984) (explaining the function of
the business judgment rule in the context of derivative actions); Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A board of directors enjoys a presumption of
sound business judgment, and its decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to
any rational business purpose.”).
161 This is an instantiation of the fundamental “separation of ownership and control”
problem analyzed by Berle and Means nearly a century ago. See generally BERLE &
MEANS, supra note 40.
162 Judge Jerome Frank coined the term “private [a]ttorney [g]eneral[ ]” to refer to one
who brings an action to “vindicate the public interest.” Associated Indus. of N.Y. State,
Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704, 705 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated on other grounds, 320 U.S. 707
(1943).
163 See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE TRIAL LAWYERS’ NEW
MERGER TAX: CORPORATE MERGERS AND THE MEGA MILLION-DOLLAR LITIGATION
TOLL ON OUR ECONOMY (October 2012), https://dandodiscourse.lexblogplatform.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/162/2012/10/U.S.-Chamber-Institute-Paper.pdf (discussing the
purportedly inefficient, and conflict-based, tendency of plaintiffs’ lawyers to challenge via
lawsuit the overwhelming majority of attempted mergers); see also supra notes 138–41
(describing several ways in which the Delaware courts have doctrinally sought to curtail
this abusive practice).
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if courts sometimes mistakenly award attorneys’ fees for frivolous litigation.164 Because the possibility of plaintiff’s counsel’s conflict is only
introduced when parties engage the court to resolve this type of dispute, the resulting conflict costs are effectively species of adjudicatory
conflict costs. In other words, “adjudicatory costs” are costs borne out
of the litigation process at large, not only those costs generated by
judges. Table 1 catalogs various types of conflict and competence
costs.
TABLE 1. CONTROL COSTS
Competence Costs

Principal

Conflict Costs

Inadequate information
and expertise

Collective action
problems

Low intellectual
endowment

Rational apathy

Low emotional
endowment

Different investment
horizons

Cognitive biases
Coordination problems

Holdouts

Different investment
goals
Conflicts due to
competing external
interests

Inadequate information
and expertise
Agent

Low intellectual
endowment

Shirking (reduced effort)
Diverting (self-dealing
and inefficient, but selfpromoting, decisions)

Cognitive biases

Adjudicatory

Inadequate information
and expertise

Plaintiffs’ Bar:

Low intellectual
endowment

Courts:

Low emotional
endowment
Cognitive biases
Crowded dockets

Fee-generating conflicts
Reputational pressures on
judges
Effects of the judges’
appointment process

04/26/2019 09:52:55

164 Substantial literature covers the agency costs associated with this model of litigation.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 679–80 (1986) (explaining that there are high agency costs
associated with derivate and class actions that depend on a variety of factors). Under our
framework, these costs are species of adjudicatory conflict costs, which in turn fall under
the larger umbrella of control costs.
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165 The unfortunate implication of this conclusion is that countries without courts below
some threshold level of adjudicatory costs are unlikely to have capital markets at all. See
Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6
(2000) (“At the extreme of no investor protection, the insiders can steal a firm’s profits
perfectly efficiently. Without a strong reputation, no rational outsider would finance such a
firm.”).
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Recognizing that principals, agents, and courts all impose control
costs clarifies why parties under certain circumstances may wish to
delegate decisionmaking authority to courts rather than reserving this
authority for themselves and vice versa. Assume a principal with high
competence costs (such as a principal with little knowledge of the
firm’s business) and an agent with low competence costs (such as an
expert) but high potential conflict costs. Assume further the parties
anticipate that the agent may engage in self-dealing and therefore
wish to prevent harmful conflicted transactions. Consider, as
previewed above, two possible governance options: The first option is
to give the principal a right to veto any transaction that involves the
agent’s self-dealing. The second option is to give the principal a right
to petition a court to challenge such transactions.
Regarding the first option, the principal—due to her inadequate
competence—may be prone to mistakenly applying the veto right,
either blocking beneficial transactions or approving harmful transactions. This erroneous application of the veto right would introduce
principal competence costs. If the court itself has a comparable level
of competence costs (such as with a nonexpert court), replacing the
competence costs of the principal with the competence costs of the
court—the second option noted above—may not reduce total control
costs. However, if the court has low competence costs (such as an
expert court), this court is likely to make fewer mistakes than the principal when choosing which transactions to block, and thus is able to
decrease total control costs, rendering the court the better option than
the veto right.
The reverse is also true. Assume a principal with low competence
costs (an expert investor) and a court with high competence costs (a
nonexpert court). Here, the principal is likely to make fewer mistakes
than the court, making the veto right the more efficient option. If both
the principal and court have low competence costs (both the principal
and the court are experts), then conflict costs associated with the adjudication process may tilt the scale toward using the veto right. Finally,
if both the court and principal have high competence costs, then the
principal must decide whether to forego the agency relationship
altogether.165
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Figure 1 broadly illustrates the interplay between principal, agent,
and adjudicatory costs. The principal can hold the agent accountable
either via the principal’s own efforts (through the use of discretionary
control rights such as shareholder voting) or with the aid of a court
(through the use of duty-enforcement rights such as the right to sue
for breach of directors’ fiduciary duties). The use of discretionary control rights will give rise to principal costs and agent costs, while the use
of duty-enforcement rights will also add adjudicatory costs into the
mix.
FIGURE 1: PRINCIPAL COSTS, AGENT COSTS,
COSTS

AND

ADJUDICATORY

Use of Duty Enforcement Rights
Adjudicatory
Costs
Principal Costs
Competence
and Conflict

Competence
and Conflict

Agent Costs
Competence
and Conflict

Use of Discretionary Control Rights

1. Total Control Costs by Decision Type

166

See supra text accompanying notes 33–34 (discussing this phenomenon).
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Having introduced a framework in which parties to a corporate
contract will seek to minimize the sum of principal costs, agent costs,
and adjudicatory costs, we turn now to an important subsidiary question: What factors contribute to the size and balance of principal,
agent, and adjudicatory costs? In this subsection, we discuss one such
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Generally stated, when parties determine that total control costs
will likely decrease with the addition of adjudicatory control costs—
that is, principal costs + agent costs are higher than principal costs +
agent costs + adjudicatory costs—conventional economic assumptions
suggest that parties will assign more decisionmaking authority to the
court.166 The opposite holds true as well. When parties determine that
adding adjudicatory control costs will likely increase total control
costs—that is, principal costs + agent costs + adjudicatory costs are
higher than principal costs + agent costs—our theory predicts that the
parties will assign more decisionmaking authority to the principal, the
agent, or both, without involving the court.
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factor: decision type. Specifically, we argue that the magnitude of total
control costs in a given situation will vary based on the type of decision that a court might be enlisted to adjudicate. We consider two
broad decision types: First, judicial decisions intended to reduce the
competence costs of either the principal or the agent; and second,
judicial decisions intended to reduce the conflict costs of either the
principal or the agent.
Competence Costs. Generally, courts are not enlisted to try to
reduce the competence costs of either principals or agents. The adjudicatory process is inherently inadequate to pass meaningful judgment
on the competence of corporate actors and very likely to increase total
control costs if granted such power. Consider a paradigmatic case
involving the competence of corporate actors: selection of a company’s board of directors. Delegating authority to the courts to consider whether individuals ought to sit on the company’s board would
likely be quite costly. Judges do not have the competence to select
directors, nor do judges employ anything resembling a human
resources department to help discern the abilities of director nominees. Therefore, involving judges in the evaluation of director nominees would likely impose high adjudicatory competence costs.
Additionally, judges do not bear the consequences of their decision,
and there is no mechanism to hold judges accountable for their mistakes in appointing the wrong directors. To make matters worse, delegating control to courts over the nomination of directors may also
introduce the distorted incentives of the plaintiffs’ bar. Insofar as the
plaintiffs’ bar may wish to pursue unnecessary litigation, involving the
judicial process in the evaluation of director nominees is therefore
likely also to impose adjudicatory conflict costs.
In contrast, shareholders have incentives to correctly appoint
directors. If principal competence costs are relatively low (such as
with institutional investors), we expect shareholders to be capable of
competently selecting individuals to sit on the company’s board. Even
if shareholder principal costs are high (such as with retail investors),
this will still not justify using courts to nominate directors. In such a
case, and despite the obvious conflict, it will be better to allow the
agent (i.e., management or the existing directors) to nominate directors because the agent is more competent than the courts and is subject to accountability mechanisms such as a compensation package
and hostile takeovers.
In light of the foregoing risk of high adjudicatory costs, our
theory predicts that courts will generally be limited by the parties to a
minor role in director elections and other decisions involving the competence of principals and agents, tasked only with refereeing proce-
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167 In Delaware, courts scrutinize board actions related to elections under the Blasius
standard, whereby the board must demonstrate a “compelling justification” for “acts done
for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power,” a
quintessential procedural restriction. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661
(Del. Ch. 1988). We consider ordinary business decisions among the paradigmatic cases in
which our theory predicts courts’ role to be limited. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805 (Del. 1984) (discussing the business judgment rule).
168 See supra notes 3–4 (describing the uniqueness of the Delaware courts’ expertise in
these matters).
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dural issues rather than ruling on the candidates’ substantive merit.
Indeed, this is precisely what the law reflects.167
Conflict Costs. Courts have traditionally been far more involved
in decisions intended to reduce the conflict costs of either the principal or the agent. Corporate conflict costs typically emerge from disputes over either the allocation of cash-flow rights or control rights
between the principal and the agent. Consider a conventional cashflow conflict: a “squeeze-out” merger in which a controlling shareholder seeks to buy out minority shareholders to obtain full control of
the company. In squeeze-outs, the controlling shareholder’s financial
interest is clearly implicated, suggesting that leaving the decision with
the board (perhaps under the influence of the controlling shareholder)
might be unwise insofar as it risks agent conflict costs. The parties may
thus wish to enlist the courts, which can scrutinize the board’s decisionmaking process in accepting the terms and price of the squeezeout.
The exact role of courts in supervising such a conflict will depend
on the magnitude of principal costs relative to that of the court in any
given situation. Unlike Delaware courts, not all courts are able to
offer a sound opinion on valuation, thus imposing adjudicatory competence costs.168 Moreover, the rent-seeking tendencies of the plaintiffs’ bar are likely to impose adjudicatory conflict costs via a desire to
litigate squeeze-out transactions at a frequency that may be higher
than what is efficient.
Assuming, however, that courts are professional (as they are in
Delaware), the relative sizes of principal costs and adjudicatory costs
will likely be the primary determinant of the role such a court might
have. For example, consider a proposed squeeze-out in a firm held
primarily by retail investors. In such a case, retail investors may
impose relatively high principal costs in the form of competence costs,
due to lack of information and expertise regarding the pricing of the
deal, and conflict costs, insofar as some shareholders might frustrate
an efficient transaction by demanding an unreasonably high price (a
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holdout problem).169 Therefore, in this situation, the court might be
enlisted to perform a substantive role, evaluating the fairness of the
squeeze-out. If we imagine the same squeeze-out, but with institutional investors instead of retail investors, things become very different. Institutional investors may impose relatively low principal
costs, due to greater expertise in valuation and a lower likelihood of
unreasonably holding out. In such a case, the court might be enlisted
to perform a more procedural role, refereeing the integrity of the vote
of disinterested shareholders.
2. Principal Competence and Ownership Composition

04/26/2019 09:52:55

169 For full analysis of the tradeoffs between requiring minority shareholder approval
and judicial supervision, see Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate SelfDealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393 (2003) (analyzing the efficiency of
the methods by which corporate law addresses the self-dealing problem).
170 One can, of course, imagine situations in which principal conflict costs would be high.
For example, if the venture capitalists (VCs) also own stakes in the company’s competitors,
we might expect them to agitate for corporate action that would help their other portfolio
companies but reduce the firm’s value.
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As we have explained, principal competence affects the optimal
option between using courts or discretionary control rights to resolve
corporate disputes. Because investor sophistication is a proxy for
investor competence, we suggest that the sophistication of a firm’s
investor base helps to predict whether it is efficient to allocate conflict-resolution authority to a court or, alternatively, keep authority
with investors for purposes of extrajudicial dispute resolution. Specifically, our theory predicts that investor sophistication should influence
the degree to which market participants employ courts to resolve corporate disputes.
To illustrate the significance of investor characteristics in determining whether the use of a court is optimal, it is helpful to consider
firms of varying hypothetical investor bases. Consider first our nowfamiliar example of Marco, the entrepreneur of a technology company, and Sarah, the investor. Assume that Sarah’s venture capital
firm has considerable experience in the technology industry and also
that Sarah’s firm owns a sizeable stake in Marco’s company. Assume
further that the remaining equity shareholders of Marco’s company
are similarly experienced and sophisticated, generating relatively few
principal competence costs. If we assume finally that each investor,
like Sarah, owns a significant stake of the company, we can also generally expect relatively low principal conflict costs, as Sarah et al. have a
clear financial incentive to ensure the success of Marco’s company.170
Given Marco’s company’s minimal exposure to principal costs, our
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theory predicts that the parties will prefer for the principals and
agents to retain significant dispute-resolution authority and only
rarely seek judicial oversight.171 This comports with what we observe
in reality, as VCs—who comprise only a small portion of investors in
U.S. public companies—often negotiate for control rights at a high
level of specificity, reserving considerable discretionary control
rights.172
Now consider the other end of the investor spectrum: Instead of
Marco’s company, consider a dispersed-ownership firm whose equity
is owned almost entirely by small, diversified retail investors who
know little about managing a large company. This lack of know-how
and small financial stake will likely generate high principal competence costs and principal conflict costs, respectively.173 In such a situation, one might expect parties to make more frequent use of judicial
dispute resolution, relying on courts to reduce conflict costs.
As a final example, consider a hypothetical intermediate firm:
Imagine a firm owned primarily by large institutional investors with
(1) some level of sophistication greater than that of retail investors but
less than the industry-expert VCs discussed above; and (2) financial
stakes in the firm greater than small retail investors but less than
highly-invested VCs, say at a rate somewhere between one and ten
percent of the firm’s total equity. In this hypothetical firm, we expect
that the institutional investors’ moderate sophistication will lead to
principal competence costs lower than those associated with retail
investors, but higher than those associated with VCs. We should fur41152-nyu_94-2 Sheet No. 68 Side A
04/26/2019 09:52:55

171 The coherence of this theory is also supported by the Scott and Triantis formulation.
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (examining the efficiency of the contracting process at the front and
back end, with a focus on litigation as the back-end stage).
172 In other words, the parties opt for a complete contract rather than an incomplete
one. See id. at 814 (“When the parties agree to precise terms (or rules), they invest more at
the front end to specify proxies in their contract, thereby leaving a smaller task for the
enforcing court.”). One might also think of this problem in terms of rules versus standards.
See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 557 (1992) (offering an “economic analysis of the extent to which legal commands
should be promulgated as rules or standards”). VCs and other sophisticated parties can
convert nebulous standards into more precise rules that provide a more optimal
arrangement for their specific circumstances.
173 There is a large literature discussing the ways in which small ownership stakes lead to
distorted incentives for investors, specifically noting that the minimal financial incentive to
monitor company management leads both to so-called “free-rider” and “rational apathy”
problems. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 526–29 (1990) (describing shareholder passivity and surveying recent scholarship that
recognizes the increased role of institutional shareholders in proxy contests). For
discussion of shareholders’ collective action problems, see Hannes, supra note 106, at
172–73. For discussion of shareholders’ rational apathy, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1575–77 (1989).
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ther expect that the institutional investors’ moderate ownership stakes
will lead to principal conflict costs lower than those generated by
retail investors but higher than those generated by VCs. In such a scenario of moderate principal competence costs and moderate principal
conflict costs, our theory predicts that the parties will enlist courts for
dispute resolution more than in our first example of the VC-owned
firm but less than in our second example of the retail-investor-owned
firm.
In the next Part, we apply our theory to the typical modern U.S.
corporation, with attention to the corresponding declined role of the
Delaware courts.
APPLICATIONS

AND

III
IMPLICATIONS

FOR

DELAWARE

Part I described the death of corporate law, illustrated by the
waning role of the Delaware courts and the increasing tendency for
market participants to resolve conflicts outside of courts. Part II introduced a theory that explains how principal costs affect shareholders’
preference between using discretionary control rights and courts. Our
theory demonstrated that the optimal role of courts depends on the
balance of principal costs, agent costs, and adjudicatory costs associated with the allocation of a given control right. This Part applies our
theory to explain the declined role of Delaware courts in resolving
corporate disputes (III.A) and to provide predictions for the future of
Delaware as the leading state of incorporation (III.B).

To explain the changed role of Delaware courts we need to analyze the current balance of control costs to identify which player’s
costs—the principal, the agent, or the courts—have led to the declined
role of Delaware courts.
Courts. We begin with the observation that the Delaware courts’
competence and conflict costs appear to have remained relatively
unchanged over the last several decades.174 The Court of Chancery,
Delaware’s specialized business-entity court, has changed little in
composition and competence, and its judges are selected via the same

04/26/2019 09:52:55

174 See Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation Leadership, 34 J.
CORP. L. 771, 777 (2009) (indicating no significant change in the method of judicial
appointment or the size and composition of the Delaware courts since the 1980s); see also
Maurice A. Hartnett, III, The History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 48 BUS. LAW.
367, 367 (1992) (providing a history of the Delaware Court of Chancery); William T.
Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Court of Chancery, DEL. CTS., http://
courts.delaware.gov/chancery/history.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (same).
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See Holland, supra note 174, at 776–77.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
177 See, e.g., TIM J. LEECH, THE CONFERENCE BD., BOARD OVERSIGHT OF LONG-TERM
VALUE CREATION AND PRESERVATION: WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE? 1 (2017), https://
www.conference-board.org/publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=7557
(“Stakeholders increasingly expect boards of directors to do more to oversee the
organizations they direct.”); F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Case for
Significant Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (June 24, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-thecase-for-significant-shareholder-engagement (explaining that Vanguard, the largest mutual
fund firm globally, understands corporate governance from the perspective of “want[ing]
to provide oversight and input to the board of directors . . . [and] count[ing] on boards to
oversee management”).
178 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 72 (2003) (describing the two approaches of studying
executive compensation, namely the “optimal contract approach” and “managerial power
approach”).
179 See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got
There, in 2 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211 (George M. Constantinides,
176
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process.175 In short, adjudicatory control costs have likely remained
largely unchanged. Our theory, therefore, suggests that Delaware’s
shift in power from courts to market actors must trace to a change in
either agent or principal costs.
Agents. There is little reason to believe that inherent agent costs
(i.e., costs imposed by managers’ exercise of control) have significantly changed over the last few decades. As to competence costs,
overall there does not appear to have been a pivotal shift in managerial competence. Perhaps more importantly, as courts are tasked
largely with monitoring management conflicts rather than competence,176 a change in the latter seems unlikely to catalyze a changed
role for the court.
Regarding conflict costs, we have found no evidence that, on
average, management has undergone a noteworthy shift in conflicted
behavior. To be sure, board oversight practices have evolved to
encourage directors to more closely scrutinize firms’ senior executives,177 but, similar to other trends we described in Part I, this change
is also driven by shareholders’ increased use of discretionary control
rights. Theoretically, changes in executive compensation techniques
might affect management conflict costs over time. That being said,
there are competing theories as to whether executive compensation is
structured to reduce agency costs or is itself a manifestation of agency
costs.178 Since 2000, there have been changes in the size (amount of
compensation has decreased) and composition (compensation has
shifted from options-based to restricted stock-based) of board compensation, but the empirical findings as to the effects on firm performance and risk-taking are inconclusive.179
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Similarly, the widespread use of “golden parachutes”—a part of
executive compensation offering a substantial payment to management upon a sale of control—should theoretically incentivize managers to sell the corporation and alleviate the problem of management
entrenchment.180 However, in practice, a substantial part of hedge
fund activism is about facilitating merger and acquisition activity.181
This reality implies that management conflict has not declined substantially on this front as well. What has changed is the method to
cope with management conflict.
Principals. This leaves one remaining possible culprit for the
courts’ changed role: a change in principal costs. If principal costs at
widely held firms have declined over the past several decades, then
our theory suggests that the reduced costs associated with investor
control have led to a shift in authority from courts to shareholders—a
result that comports with the narrative presented in Part I and the
theory expounded in Part II. Indeed, the decline in the role of the
Delaware courts has coincided with a shift in the ownership structure
of U.S. equity markets; retail investors have vacated their place to
large, sophisticated institutional investors.182
A few figures help to shed light on the magnitude of this change:
In 1965, American mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies held shares of U.S. corporations worth a total of $36 billion, $43
billion, and $21 billion, respectively.183 The holdings of these three
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Milton Harris & Rene M. Stulz eds., 2013) (documenting the present state of executive
compensation and how it has evolved over the past century); Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix
& Dirk Jenter, Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence 1 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23596, 2017), http://www.nber.org/papers/w23596
(surveying “the theoretical and empirical literature on executive compensation”). Given
the conflicting and inconclusive evidence, we consider any broad claim on the relationship
between executive compensation and management conflict to be speculative at this time.
180 Empirically, however, the effects of golden parachutes on management incentives
are inconclusive. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Golden
Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 140 (2014) (showing the
conflicting effects that golden parachutes have on management incentives).
181 See J.P. MORGAN, supra note 118, at 4 (“More than 500 M&A-related campaign
demands were made by activists globally during the 2016 and 2017 proxy seasons,
representing approximately 75% of total value demands for that period.”).
182 See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 897 (2007)
(“In 1965, institutional investors held 16% of U.S. equities; by 2001, institutional investors
held 61%.”).
183 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 1965–1974, at 95 tbl.L.213 (2014)
[hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE TABLES 1965–1974], http://www.federalreserve.gov/
releases/z1/20140306/annuals/a1965-1974.pdf (showing that the entire equity market of all
U.S. public shares was worth less than $750 billion at the time). Shares of U.S. corporations
not held by institutional investors were held directly by the public or by large shareholders,
including controlling shareholders. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of
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groups amounted to a relatively small fraction of the stock market:
5% for mutual funds, 6% for pension funds, and 3% for insurance
companies.184 By 1980 the portion of the equity market held by these
three groups had grown, and the division between them had changed:
3.1% for mutual funds, 17.4% for pension funds, and 5.1% for insurance companies.185 At the time, the market capitalization of listed
domestic companies was $1.36 trillion,186 and institutional investors
held $436.2 billion in equity altogether.187
These figures have since continued to grow rapidly.188 In 2016,
mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies held shares
worth $9.1 trillion, $2.3 trillion, and $811 billion of U.S. corporation
shares, respectively.189 Even with the tremendous growth of the equity
market itself, with an aggregate market capitalization of over $25 trillion for all public companies in 2016,190 these three groups of institutional investors collectively hold over 50% of the market.191
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Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837,
848 (1999) (discussing ownership patterns of U.S. corporations and noting the presence of
controlling shareholders in an appreciable segment of the economy).
184 FEDERAL RESERVE TABLES 1965–1974, supra note 183, at 95 tbl.L.213.
185 James M. Poterba & Andrew A. Samwick, Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market
Fluctuations, and Consumption, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 295, 313
tbl.5 (William C. Brainard & George L. Perry eds., 1995) (describing the changing pattern
of stock ownership during the previous three decades and the association between share
price movements and consumption).
186 Market Capitalization of Listed Domestic Companies (Current US$), WORLD BANK:
DATA, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=us (last visited
Oct. 19, 2018) (listing the market capitalization of listed domestic companies for multiple
countries over variable spans of time).
187 See Edward Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 1, 3 (examining the
“role of institutional investors in corporate governance and whether regulation is likely to
encourage them to become active stewards”).
188 See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Institutional Investors:
Power and Responsibility, Speech at Georgia State University (Apr. 19, 2013), https://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch041913laahtm (summarizing data to demonstrate the
growth of institutional investors).
189 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: SECOND QUARTER 2018, at 130 tbl.L.223 (2018), https://www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20180920/z1.pdf (listing the amount of U.S. equities various
actors hold).
190 See Bespoke Investment Group, U.S. Stock Market Tops $25 Trillion - Up $1.9
Trillion Since Election, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 27, 2017, 1:49 AM), https://
seekingalpha.com/article/4040012-u-s-stock-market-tops-25-trillion-1_9-trillion-sinceelection (detailing the total stock market capitalization for stocks in the Russell 2000 since
2002). As of September 2018, the total market capitalization of the S&P 500 companies
was $25.8 trillion. S&P 500 Historical Total Market Cap & Float Adjusted Cap, SIBLIS RES.,
http://siblisresearch.com/data/total-market-cap-sp-500 (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
191 See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ANNUAL TABLES 2005–2015, at 123 tbl.L.223 (2016), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/annuals/a2005-2015.pdf.
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Within this group of institutional investors, a few money managers wield especially significant influence.192 For instance, in the
commercial sector, BlackRock Funds holds approximately $6.3 trillion
in assets under management,193 Vanguard Group holds $5.1 trillion,194
State Street Global Advisors holds $2.7 trillion,195 Fidelity
Investments holds $2.1 trillion,196 and Prudential Financial holds $1.4
trillion.197 The largest public pension funds are also, by any measure,
enormous.198 Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association has over $1
trillion in assets under management,199 and the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System’s investment fund is valued at over
$347 billion.200
Institutional investors in the aggregate thus exert notable influence on corporate governance.201 In most firms, institutional investors
collectively hold a dominant position.202 Their presence, considered in
terms of ownership concentration, is even more pronounced in the
largest corporations, with institutional shareholders owning on
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192 See Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual
Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 55 (2013) (stating that three
specific mutual funds dominate other mutual funds in terms of the size of assets under
management).
193 About Us, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/au/individual/about-blackrock
(last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
194 Fast Facts About Vanguard, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/
fast-facts (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
195 ST. STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com/na/us/institutional-investor/en/
home.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
196 Fidelity by the Numbers: Corporate Statistics, FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/
about-fidelity/fidelity-by-numbers/corporate-statistics (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
197 Prudential Financial Fact Sheet, PRUDENTIAL, http://www.news.prudential.com/
press_file.cfm?presskit_id=68 (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
198 See Alan R. Palmiter, Staying Public: Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital Markets,
3 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 245, 266–67 (2009) (describing public pension funds).
199 Who We Are, TIAA, https://www.tiaa.org/public/plansponsors/who-we-are (last
visited Nov. 2, 2018).
200 CalPERS Investment Fund Values, CALPERS, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/page/
investments/asset-classes/trust-level-portfolio-management/investment-fund-values (last
visited Oct. 21, 2018). It is noteworthy that there were similar developments in the United
Kingdom. See OFFICE FOR NAT’L STATISTICS, STATISTICAL BULLETIN: SHARE OWNERSHIP
SURVEY 2008, at 4 tbl.A, 5 tbl.B (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pnfc1/
share-ownership---share-register-survey-report/2008/share-ownership---share-registersurvey-report--share-ownership.pdf (suggesting that there is a growing presence of
institutional investors); see also BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 344–46 (2008) (describing the rise of
institutional share ownership in the United Kingdom).
201 See Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap Between Ownership and Control, 34 J.
CORP. L. 409, 425 (2009) (“[I]nstitutional investors tend to acquire a significant portion of
stock in a corporation to gain a measure of control in the corporation.”).
202 See id.; Aguilar, supra note 188 (“Simply stated, institutional investors are dominant
market players . . . .”).
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average over 70% of the stock in such firms.203 Even among institutional investors, the market is highly concentrated. The largest twentyfive institutions hold more than 30% of all U.S. corporate shares,204
and the largest ten managers managed 26.5% of all assets.205
Moreover, the three biggest asset management institutions,
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, when considered in combination, are the “single” largest shareholder, with mean ownership over
17%, in many U.S. listed companies (1662 out of approximately 3900
firms in 2015), and particularly among the S&P 500 (438 out of 500
firms).206
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that, given these sizable
stakes and related market concentration, institutional shareholders
have become capable of influencing the behavior of their portfolio
companies. Not only are these institutional investors more sophisticated than the retail investors of years past, but their ownership
blocks are far larger, reducing coordination costs and providing
greater monitoring incentives.207 Several major asset managers have
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203 See MATTEO TONELLO & STEPHAN RABIMOV, THE CONFERENCE BD., THE 2010
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO
COMPOSITION 27 (2010), http://shareholderforum.com/e-mtg/Library/20101111_
ConferenceBoard.pdf (showing that in 2009, ownership concentration of institutional
investors in the top 1000 U.S. corporations by market value was 73%). For instance,
institutional investors currently hold 61.3% of Apple. Apple Inc. (AAPL): Major Holders,
YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=AAPL+Major+Holders (last visited Oct.
21, 2018). In another telling example, institutional investors currently hold 74.6% of
Microsoft. See Microsoft Corporation (MSFT): Major Holders, YAHOO! FIN., https://
finance.yahoo.com/quote/MSFT/holders?p=MSFT&.tsrc=fin-srch (last visited Oct. 23,
2018).
204 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills 20 (N.Y. Univ. Sch.
of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 17-08, 2017), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2928883.
205 As of December 2016. Itzhak Ben-David et al., The Granular Nature of Large
Institutional Investors 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22247, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22247.pdf.
206 Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of the
Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New
Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 311–13 (2017).
207 Indeed, not doing so may violate their fiduciary duties under federal law. See Proxy
Voting, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2018) (prohibiting the “exercise [of] voting authority with
respect to client securities” by investment advisers without implementation of “written
policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that [the adviser] vote[s]
client securities in the best interest of clients”); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the
Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including
Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01(1) (2018) (fiduciary duties
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 “require the responsible
fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that may affect the value of the plan’s investment”).
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specialized in-house corporate governance offices dedicated precisely
to this monitoring role.208
To the extent that institutional investors are hesitant to take an
active role in agitating for corporate change, other investors—such as
activist hedge funds—now step in to fill the void.209 These changes
have created costs of their own,210 but, on balance, it seems that principal costs are lower now than they were several decades ago. Thus,
the relative costliness of adjudication suggests under our theory that
shifting control from courts to shareholders would be preferred—consistent with the evidence presented in Part I. Put simply, shareholders
seem to have become sufficiently sophisticated and incentivized to
fend for themselves, reducing the need for judicial assistance.
B. Delaware’s Future in Corporate Law and Governance
This Section turns to the implications and predictions for the
future. Section III.B.1 considers the role of courts in an age of sophisticated shareholders and argues that changes in the composition of
U.S. shareholders imply, under our theory, a more limited role for
courts and litigation more generally. Section III.B.2 then narrows the
scope, discussing the future role of the State of Delaware. We predict
that changes to the aggregate character of public shareholders will
lead to a more limited role for the state, but also that these changes
are unlikely to cause a mass exodus of public corporations to other
jurisdictions. To ensure its continued dominance and participatory
role in the corporate law space, however, Delaware must adapt to the
decreased need for court-centered dispute resolution.

Under our theory, parties seek to minimize the sum of principal,
agent, and adjudicatory costs. Therefore, an increase in principal
sophistication (reducing principal competence costs) suggests that parties will have less of a need for judicial dispute resolution, as the latter
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208 See, e.g., Investment Stewardship, B LACK R OCK , https://www.blackrock.com/
corporate/en-gb/about-us/investment-stewardship (last visited Oct. 21, 2018) (describing
how the BlackRock Investment Stewardship team engages with companies and
disseminates information to “[p]rotect and enhance the value of clients’ assets”).
209 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 24, at 895–96 (“Activist investors specialize in
monitoring portfolio company strategy and formulating alternatives when appropriate for
presentation to the institutional investors; in turn, institutional investors specialize in
portfolio management and in evaluating proposals presented by activist investors.”).
210 See generally Rose, supra note 182, at 906 (outlining concerns about governance
standards with “limited or no evidentiary support” and rigid models inhibiting potentially
beneficial experimentation).
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risks introducing unnecessary adjudicatory costs.211 Instead, market
participants are likely to utilize discretionary control rights to achieve
their objectives.212
Indeed, we have already observed several salient instantiations of
this trend, whereby market participants stay away from courts,
electing instead to use discretionary control rights to resolve various
corporate disputes.213 The presence of repeat-player, sophisticated
shareholders militates toward a corporate law environment in which
courts play a relatively procedural role, with substantive decisionmaking authority retained by principals, agents, or some combination
thereof.
As the role of courts has become more procedural, we can
observe a shift of the locus of power from public decisionmakers, such
as courts, to private decisionmakers, such as proxy advisers and large
institutional investors. This shift away from substantive judicial adjudication toward the exercise of discretionary control rights has
resulted in boards being more constrained by the likely responses of
large institutional shareholders and proxy advisers than by the anticipated legality of their actions under Delaware law.214 When institutional investors wield the necessary ownership to make a “withhold
vote” a threat, sometimes coupled with “majority vote” and “proxy
access” mechanisms,215 it is entirely sensible for board members to
reorient their focus toward the approval of institutional investors and
other private decisionmakers rather than of the judiciary.216 This
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211 See supra Section II.B (outlining our theory and the aim of parties to minimize the
sum of principal, agent, and adjudicatory costs).
212 See supra Section I.B.1 (providing several examples of this private ordering).
213 See supra Section I.B.1 (highlighting examples of the trend away from the courts and
towards discretionary control rights).
214 See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 688 (2005)
(“[P]owerful CEOs come on bended knee to Rockville, Maryland, where [Institutional
Shareholder Services] resides, to persuade the managers of ISS of the merits of their views
about issues like proposed mergers, executive compensation, and poison pills.”); supra
Section I.B.1 (noting that, despite open questions about their legality, golden leash poison
pills have largely been abandoned by management out of fear of retribution by
institutional owners).
215 See supra note 102 (describing shareholder success at getting “majority vote” and
“proxy-access” mechanisms implemented in bylaws).
216 In addition to the cases mentioned in Part I, consider also other scattered, but
increasingly conspicuous, instances of institutional investors disciplining directors without
judicial assistance. A recent paper examined whether “institutional investors follow
directors to new firms with their equity investments” and answered with “an emphatic
yes.” See Jay Dahya & Richard Herron, Do Investors Follow Directors? 32 (Nov. 21, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943540. In other words, corporate
directors must operate under the assumption that major investors will reward directors for
good performance (and correspondingly withhold this reward for bad performance) even
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increased influence of private decisionmakers may portend a transformation of American corporate dispute resolution from court-centered
to control-centered dispute resolution. In turn, this dynamic may
assign corporate law only a secondary role.
2. Delaware’s Future Challenges
In this section, we turn from the macro-level observation to the
microcosmic implications for the State of Delaware. Many scholars
have attributed Delaware’s dominance in the field of corporate law at
least in part to its judicial system.217 Professor Roberta Romano, in
describing Delaware’s dominance, cites Delaware’s “substantial body”
of precedent, its “judicial expertise,” the predictability of its judicial
decisions, and the likelihood that “any specific corporate law issue will
be, or has been, adjudicated” by its courts.218 Professor Michael
Klausner likewise identifies the “network benefits” associated with
Delaware judicial precedents as a key factor contributing to
Delaware’s success in attracting corporate charters.219 According to
Klausner, firms incorporate in Delaware in part to realize the benefits
of positive “network externalities” produced by Delaware deci-
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after directors have moved on to a different firm. Similarly, Dimension Fund Advisors, the
eighth-largest mutual fund in the United States, recently threatened to vote against
directors who approved frowned-upon (by Dimension Fund Advisors, that is) governance
mechanisms without the approval of shareholders, not only at the specific company that
implemented the mechanism but at all boards upon which a given director sits. See
Toonkel, supra note 38.
217 See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Why Delaware Must Retain Its Corporate Dominance and
Why It May Not, in CAN DELAWARE BE DETHRONED? 225, 227 (Stephen M. Bainbridge et
al. eds., 2018) (“[T]he most important reason for the Delaware dominance in
incorporations is judicially based.”); Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Delaware’s
Prominence by Design, Foreword to R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS F-1, F-15–16 (3d ed.
Supp. 2001) (describing Delaware’s judicial proficiency, rich body of precedents, and
specialized bar as different manifestations of scale economies); Mark J. Roe, Takeover
Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321, 351 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) (arguing that the
value of legal standardization helps Delaware retain its lead).
218 Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 3, at 277; see also Romano, State
Competition, supra note 3, at 722 (describing “a comprehensive body of case law” and
“judicial expertise” as Delaware assets).
219 See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757, 776, 842–47 (1995) (“[T]o the extent that future judicial interpretations
are beneficial, they are network benefits associated with particular corporate contract
terms.”). For a more skeptical view of the Delaware courts, see Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 459 (2001)
(“[T]here are signs of growing discomfort with the more extreme forms of unpredictable ex
post decisionmaking that have sometimes been characteristic of, say, the Delaware
courts.”).
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Klausner, supra note 219, at 842–47.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text (describing the theory that companies
incorporating in Delaware benefit from network effects).
222 The advantages of the Delaware courts in this respect are well recognized. See Curtis
Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 885, 918 (1990) (“[T]he small, expert, and nondiverse Delaware judiciary reduces
agency costs in two ways. First, Delaware has only one trial court with jurisdiction to hear
corporate cases, the Court of Chancery (in which no jury trials occur). . . . Second . . . the
judges in Delaware are expert in corporate law.”); Kenju Watanabe, Control Transaction
Governance: Collective Action and Asymmetric Information Problems and Ex Post
Policing, 36 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 45, 102 (2016) (“As a court of equity, the Chancery
Court has no juries. This assures that the court resolves factual issues quickly, even in
situations in which trials need to be held, and without the risk of making errors that may
result from having a lay jury.”); see also Savitt, supra note 4 (describing the “uncommon”
efficiency of the Delaware Court of Chancery).
223 See Watanabe, supra note 222, at 102 (noting the lack of juries in the Chancery Court
and the efficient process for appeals).
221
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sions.220 These theories are premised on the assumption that
Delaware courts play an active and substantive role in corporate
governance.
If Delaware’s judicial system is indeed responsible for the state’s
success in attracting corporate charters, then a decline in the courts’
opportunity to resolve corporate disputes may imply that market centrism risks Delaware ceding its prominent position. This risk would be
particularly acute to the extent that the judicial system’s importance
stems from its substantive role in adjudicating corporate disputes. If
the courts’ judicial expertise in resolving these highly technical disputes is critical, then a shift away from adjudication toward discretionary control rights would seem to provide less reason for firms to
incorporate—or stay incorporated—in Delaware. Similarly, if
Delaware’s success hinges on the network benefits associated with the
interpretation of its precedents,221 the diminished importance of these
precedents would imply fewer reasons for firms to turn to Delaware.
However, there are at least two reasons to suspect that the
increase of market participants employing discretionary control rights
will not lead to Delaware entirely relinquishing its dominance as a
corporate governance forum. First, even if the substantive role of the
Delaware courts is diminished, Delaware’s courts are still very much
operationally effective.222 The Chancery Court renders expert decisions quickly and efficiently, without juries, and based mostly on
written testimonies.223 There is little reason to expect other states to
surpass Delaware in this regard—even as the Delaware courts’ substantive role declines, other states would have to incur substantial
costs to match, let alone overcome, the positive network externalities
associated with Delaware’s operational efficacy.
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Second, there are at least some transaction costs associated with
reincorporation, although scholars have debated their precise magnitude.224 So long as Delaware refrains from imposing inefficient adjudicatory costs that exceed the transaction costs of reincorporation,
Delaware appears poised to retain its historical prominence. An inefficient, litigation-friendly regime, however, will increase adjudicatory
costs and threaten the state’s position as the leading state of incorporation.225 Thus, Delaware courts must align themselves with shareholders as a whole, and not with nominal shareholder plaintiffs and
their lawyers.226
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224 Compare Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 586–88 (1990) (claiming transaction costs associated with
reincorporation are trivial), with ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE LAW 34–35, 34 n.11 (1993) (“Besides understating some of the large one-time
reincorporation costs . . . Black excludes from his calculation the increased costs that firms
bear over their lifetime from a move, such as increased listing, tax, and attorney’s fees.”),
and Romano, Law as a Product, supra note 3, at 246–48 (“The cost [of reincorporation]
estimates varied quite a bit, ranging from a few thousand to well over a million dollars . . . .
There is also an array of more indirect expenses . . . .”). In addition to the direct costs of
reincorporation, path dependence is an additional cost that might limit incorporation and
reincorporation in other states. See A. Gilchrist Sparks III & Daniel D. Matthews,
Delaware’s Continued Resilience: The Next Hundred Years, in CAN DELAWARE BE
DETHRONED?, supra note 217, at 238, 258 (“Inertia, including the familiarity of lawyers
and investors across the country with Delaware law, further reinforces Delaware’s
dominance and is not something that can be readily reproduced.”).
225 As other scholars have observed, amendments to the Delaware General Corporation
Law are effectively controlled by the Section of Corporation Law of the Delaware State
Bar Association, which tends to be led by local defense firms with more interest in
preserving incorporations in-state than in a large volume of litigation. See Bo Becker,
Daniel Bergstresser & Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm
Value? Evidence from the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127, 137
(2013) (“[I]t is well known that the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar
Association, not the Delaware legislature, creates Delaware corporate law.”); Faith
Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in Corporate
Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 70 (2009) (highlighting the influence of the Delaware State
Bar Association). As of December 2018, the Section of Corporation Law was led by
partners at four prominent defense firms: Connolly Gallagher LLP; Morris James LLP;
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP; and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.
About the Section of Corporation Law, DEL. ST. BAR ASS’N, https://www.dsba.org/sectionscommittees/sections-of-the-bar/corporation-law (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).
226 The Delaware plaintiffs’ bar has little incentive to limit adjudicatory costs. Whereas
the franchise taxes Delaware levies on its corporations incentivize state lawmakers,
including courts, to create value-enhancing law, the plaintiffs’ bar has a very different and
very powerful goal: maximizing attorneys’ fees. Because attorneys’ fees can be earned only
to the extent that courts hold decisionmaking authority, one would expect a rational, selfinterested plaintiffs’ bar to seek to maximize this judicial authority—even if the balance of
principal, agent, and adjudicatory costs implies that the use of courts in a given situation is
suboptimal. As long as enterprising plaintiffs’ attorneys can find nominal shareholder
plaintiffs—which history suggests is not particularly difficult—and the promise of fees
remains, these attorneys will likely continue bringing litigation even when shareholders in
the aggregate would be better off without it. For a clear view of this type of
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Thus far, Delaware seems to be resisting the urge of the plaintiffs’
bar to increase the quantity of corporate litigation.227 As we have
observed, Delaware courts have begun to empower shareholders to
use discretionary control rights over cash flow rights conflicts, which
require the procedural involvement of courts, rather than dutyenforcement rights, which require substantive judicial involvement.228
The Delaware courts have (1) accorded greater weight to shareholder
approval of a merger vis-à-vis post-transaction lawsuits;229 (2) limited
the exposure of independent directors approving conflicted transactions;230 (3) applied the business judgment rule to controlling shareholder self-dealing transactions when approved by both independent
committee and disinterested shareholders;231 (4) restricted the use of
the statutory appraisal right by assigning substantial weight to the
merger price;232 and (5) curtailed disclosure-only settlements.233
Delaware has approved the use of forum selection clauses in both corporate charters and bylaws, helping corporations to prevent the plaintiffs’ bar from migrating to more litigation-friendly forums.234
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“entrepreneurial” litigation, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS
RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE (2015). See also Fisch et al., supra note 141, at 572 (“The
structure of disclosure-only settlements is likely about something else—justification of a
fee award to plaintiffs’ counsel.”).
227 See Matt Chiappardi, Del. Plaintiffs Bar Rattled by Seismic Shift in Merger Law,
LAW360 (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/891000/del-plaintiffs-bar-rattledby-seismic-shift-in-merger-law (“The Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling . . . is the latest in a
series of decisions that some on the plaintiffs [sic] bar say represent a seismic shift in
bedrock M&A law that will close the door on shareholder claims.”).
228 See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing duty-enforcement rights).
229 See supra Section I.B.2 (surveying cases demonstrating increased judicial deference
to shareholder approval).
230 See Leal v. Meeks (In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc., Stockholder Litig.), 115
A.3d 1173, 1182–83 (Del. 2015). In re Cornerstone has left market participants responsible
for disciplining independent directors who approve conflict transactions. See supra notes
123–24 and accompanying text (describing the practical effects of exempting directors from
discipline by the courts).
231 See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (holding that
business judgment is the standard of review for “mergers between a controlling
stockholder and its corporate subsidiary” where the merger is premised on approval of
both a truly independent committee and the “uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of
the minority stockholders”).
232 See supra note 135 (collecting cases illustrating this trend).
233 In In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 (Del. Ch. 2016), the
Delaware Chancery made clear that it intends to scrutinize disclosure-only settlements
much more carefully going forward. See also Walsh & Sims, supra note 136, at 1–2
(explaining the history leading up to In re Trulia and speculating on possible consequences
of the decision).
234 See Delaware Legislature Approves DGCL Amendments Endorsing Delaware Forum
Selection Clauses and Prohibiting Fee-Shifting Provisions, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (June 15,
2015), https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2015/06/delaware-legislatureapproves-dgcl-amendments (summarizing approved amendments as “(i) authoriz[ing]
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Here again, it bears mentioning: While Delaware courts have
actively and correctly developed doctrine that facilitates private
ordering and reduces Delaware’s role as corporate arbiter, this retreat
was not solely the product of judicial volition but rather the product of
market necessity. In order to preserve its dominance as the leading
state of incorporation, Delaware had to pull back from its former substantive role in accordance with the idea that has animated this
Article: The more competent shareholders become, the less important
corporate law will be.
CONCLUSION

04/26/2019 09:52:55

forum selection clauses in the charters or bylaws of Delaware corporations . . . (ii)
prohibit[ing] clauses designating only courts outside of Delaware as the exclusive forum for
internal corporate claims and (iii) invalidat[ing] fee-shifting provisions in the charters or
bylaws”). For a look at the empirical effects of forum selection clauses, see Matthew D.
Cain et al., Essay, The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603, 619–30
(2018).
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This Article has argued that the compositional transformation of
U.S. equity markets has led to the death of corporate law, as the regulation of U.S. publicly traded corporations has shifted from courts to
markets. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation,
and its courts have declined in importance. In order to explain the
declined role of Delaware and corporate law more broadly, we introduced a novel theory demonstrating that the difference between the
principal’s and the court’s competence is the critical factor when
seeking to determine whether parties will prefer judicial intervention
or private dispute resolution. When the principal has relatively low
competence, parties are more likely to rely on a court to resolve
future disputes; the more competent the principal, the less efficient it
becomes to enlist courts as opposed to utilizing extra-judicial conflict
resolution techniques.
Our triangulation of control costs—principal, agent, and adjudicatory—allows not only for an explanation as to the broader decline
of corporate law, but also for a postmortem analysis of the declined
role of Delaware in particular. In stark contrast to its long-held prominence, in many key decisions today the Delaware courts are no longer
able to dictate the substantive final terms of corporate conflict resolution. Instead, increasingly sophisticated market participants have
elected to sidestep the court in part or whole, relying on extrajudicial,
party-centric activity to resolve corporate conflicts. The Delaware
courts have generally accommodated this shift away from judicial resolution. However, our analysis demonstrates that market forces, not
Delaware courts, have catalyzed this new balance of corporate con-
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trol. Today’s institutional shareholders perceive themselves as sophisticated market participants capable of achieving governance aims via
activism without judicial assistance and as a result, prefer not to incur
adjudicatory costs when avoidable. The Delaware courts are therefore
increasingly edged into the role of procedural supervisors, or forced to
observe governance tussles from the sidelines.
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